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INTRODUCTION

"Development" is increasingly one of the pressing purposes of the
international legal regimes within which intellectual property operates.
From skirmishes during the G8 Summit over whether promoting public
health along with innovation should be among the goals of intellectual
property' to consensus on recommendations for a WIPO Development
Agenda (WIPO Development Agenda),2 development is now an
1. Group of Eight (G8), Joint Statement by the German G8 Presidency and the
Heads of State and/or Government of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa on the
Occasion of the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany 1-2 (June 8, 2007), http://www.g8.de/nsc true/Content/EN/Artikel/_g8-summit/anlagen/o5-erklaerung-en,templateld=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/o5-erklaerung-en; see also Ravi Kanth Devarakonda, G8: Health
2007,
G5,
IPS,
June
8,
Says
Over
Intellectual Property Rights,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38098.
2. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Provisional Committee on
Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda [PCDA], Fourth Session Draft Report, at
29-30, Annex I, PCDA/4/3/Prov.2 (June 11-15, 2007) [hereinafter PCDA Final
Recommendations], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_4/pcda_4 3_prov_2.pdf.
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unmistakable and ubiquitous feature of international intellectual property.
Yet, like other areas of international trade law, the design of international
intellectual property law lags behind the development rhetoric of
international institutions.' Accordingly, we propose several non-mutuallyexclusive, non-exhaustive methods for pursuing the goal of development
within international intellectual property regimes:
(1) Exploring principles of treaty interpretation to maximize the
potential of TRIPS articles 7 and 84 as balancing mechanisms
5
within World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisprudence;
(2) Positing "development" as a key legal term of art through a
substantive equality principle within the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), to 6link intellectual property and innovation to
human development; and
(3) Recognizing emerging rules of customary international law and
maximizing international law principles of non-derogation and
3. Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reflections
on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
221, 250 (2007) ("Form follows function, and function follows purpose, but in the WTO the
ostensible shift in telos from trade to development is incomplete and risks superficiality,
[and] is not supported by a corresponding change in its actual workings."). See generally
Sungjoon Cho, Doha's Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165 (2007); Lan Cao, Culture
Change, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 357 (2007).
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, arts. 7-8, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1200-01 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
5. See infra Part I; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 191, 220-21 (Lucie
Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (noting the need for more elaboration of articles
7 and 8 to preserve balance and a robust international public domain); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS
and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 369, 389-92 (2006) (advocating the
exploration of public interest safeguards in TRIPS such as articles 7 and 8); MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 411 (3d ed.
2005) (noting that "Part I [of TRIPS] . . . acknowledges that a balance of legitimate
(potentially competing interests) must be struck in determining the appropriate level and kind
of intellectual property protection guaranteed by the GATT."); Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing
Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of
TRIPS and PharmaceuticalPatent Protection, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 884,

893-94 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
6. See infra Part II; see also Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the
Development Divide, 27 CARDozO L. REv. 2821, 2828 (2006); Broude, supra note 3, at 253
(development "is nevertheless a yet-undefined but operative term in some of its legal texts,
such as the Special and Differential Treatment provisions of Articles XII:3(d) and XVIII of
the GATT, Article 21.2 of the DSU, Articles 3(c), 5 and 6 of the Enabling Clause, and
Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).").
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freedom of implementation, to maintain national policy space and
flexibility for social welfare objectives in the context of post-TRIPS
bilateral and regional treaties.7
These illustrative proposals reflect the growing complexity of
international intellectual property norm-setting and norm-interpretation
activities, which take place in multiple fora and jurisdictions, globally and
Nuanced approaches differentiating among countries,
domestically.
technologies, and social policies for purposes of furthering development
goals require serious attention in intellectual property.
Before elaborating upon our proposed methods, we first unpack the
concepts of development and trade, respectively. They signify quite
different goals and values for industrialized versus developing countries and
are often relatively a "black box" to intellectual property lawyers
unaccustomed to thinking about balance in the global intellectual property
context. After exploring the different dimensions of development and trade
relevant to intellectual property, we then situate them within a larger
conceptual framework. We discuss the evolving nature and purpose of the
WTO; the desirability of linking intellectual property to trade, and therefore
inevitably to public health, and other aspects of development; and the
consequences of understanding international intellectual property law and
policy-making as a regime complex that includes development as a goal (or
"function") of innovation.
We join the growing discussion about the appropriate mix of
development and trade,' given the foundational balance in intellectual
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Other extant proposals to address asymmetries in the international intellectual
property system include Margaret Chon, A Substantive Equality Principle in International
Intellectual Property Norm-Setting, in TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA (Daniel Gervais

ed., forthcoming 2007); Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 220-21 (advocating the use
of "substantive maxima" to preserve an international public domain of knowledge); Yu,
supra note 5, at 387-89 (engaging in the "constructive ambiguit[y]" of TRIPS so as to
maximize the possibility of a "pro-development" presumption in norm-interpretation, and
suggesting several other directions); Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade &
Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 505, 528-34 [hereinafter Gervais,
Intellectual Property] (suggesting that developing countries utilize the "normative elasticity"
of TRIPS to formulate policy responsive to their needs); Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global
Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 33-41 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman eds., 2005) (suggesting a moratorium on stronger intellectual property standards
and an institutional infrastructure for reconciling existing standards with national systems of

innovation); Ruth L. Okediji, SustainableAccess to CopyrightedDigital Information Works
in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 181-86 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome
H. Reichman eds., 2005) (suggesting a number of proposals, including an international fair
use doctrine); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-RoundII: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
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property between rights to exclude and access to a robust public domain.'
Within U.S. intellectual property scholarship, however, questions of
"development" tend to be segregated within scholarship about developing
countries, and "balance" tends to be situated within the context of
industrialized countries."° What might a pro-development international
intellectual property balance look like? Balance is rarely analyzed within
the context of the development mandates of the WTO and the WIPO, and
other institutions that together constitute the so-called international
intellectual property regime complex. While the rhetoric of development
(according to the Doha Development Round, on the WTO side, and the
WIPO Development Agenda and United Nations Millennium Development
Goals (UNMDG), on the WIPO side) is au courant now within international
intellectual property institutions, development concerns have not been
integrated into the dialogue about intellectual property balance. This Article
seeks to redress these omissions as well as to disrupt the dichotomy between
developed and developing country conversations on these foundational
policy issues.
I. THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT IN INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

A. A Development Divide and Two Trade Puzzles
1. Development: Freedom and Growth
From a development perspective, international intellectual property
laws have narrowed available options for regulating knowledge goods for
purposes of domestic capacity-building based on the enhancement of human
development. We refer to this model of development as a "development as
freedom" model, to contrast it with the predominant model based upon
"development as growth." The relationship between intellectual property

CfI. L. REv. 21, 21-22 (2004) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round I1] (calling for the
articulation of a user right in the context of TRIPS); Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing
Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L.
REv. 249, 249-54, 289-92 (2003) (urging developed countries to expand the exhaustion/first

sale doctrines and refuse to enforce one-sided license agreements).
9. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 220-21 ("But even if the constraints
of international law are lifted or loosened, it can be argued that international intellectual
property law should be framed to do more, that it should be viewed not only as an obstacle to
be overcome, but also as an affirmative protection of the public domain against
encroachments by member states.") (emphasis added).
10. Cf EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FuTuRE (2007), available at
http://documents.epo.org/projectsfbabylon/eponet.nsf/0/63A726D28B589B5BC 12572DB005
97683/$File/CPOscenarios bookmarked.pdf (forecasting four global scenarios of

intellectual property balance across countries with different levels of development).
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and the model of development as freedom has received relatively little
attention in intellectual property circles.
By human development (or capability), we refer primarily to the
concept advocated by Amartya Sen" and Martha Nussbaum. According to
the latter, there are "certain basic functional capabilities at which societies
should aim for their citizens, and which quality of life measurements should
measure." 12 This list includes:
(1)

LIFE.

Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length ....

(2) BODILY HEALTH. Being able to have good health, including reproductive
health; to be adequately nourished ....

(4) SENSES, IMAGINATION, AND THOUGHT. Being able to use the senses; being
able to imagine, to think, and to reason-and to do these things in a "truly human"
way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no
13
means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training ....

The development as freedom model figures prominently in the
UNMDG."4 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has
propounded the model of development as freedom since 1991."5 The human
development index (HDI) approach, as opposed to the gross domestic
product (GDP) approach standing alone, emphasizes the distribution of
human capability opportunities in measuring development. 6 It includes not
11.

See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).

12.

Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities,Female Human Beings, in WOMEN,
A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 82 (Martha C.

CULTURE,

AND DEVELOPMENT:

Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
13.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilitiesand Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
273, 287 (1997). This list is slightly different from the version published earlier in Human
Capabilities, in note 12 above, and was apparently revised as a result of recent visits to
development projects in India. See id. at 286.
14. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2
(Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium. Philip Alston claims that these
have arguably attained the status of customary international law. Philip Alston, Ships
Passing in the Night: The CurrentState of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen
Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HuM. RTS. Q. 755, 771-75
(2005). The 2002 report by the UK Government's Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights was an early attempt to link intellectual property to the UNMDG. See DUNCAN
MATTHEWS,

(2006),
6.pdf.

NGOs,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS

3-4

http://www.ipngos.org/Report/IPNGOs%20final%20report%2December/20200-

15. See MAHBUB UL HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: How THE Focus
OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS SHIFTS FROM NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTING TO PEOPLECENTERED POLICIES, TOLD BY ONE OF THE CHIEF ARCHITECTS OF THE NEW PARADIGM (1995).
16.
See U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 1991, at 15-18,
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1991/en (inaugurating new criterion of development, the
Human Development Index (HDI), which measures development through longevity,
knowledge and income sufficiency). This is a highly simplified index; in fact, HDI is more
than about education and health. Selim Jahan, Evolution of the Human Development Index,

in

READINGS

IN HUMAN

DEVELOPMENT:

CONCEPTS, MEASURES,
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only the standard of living measure of per capita GDP, but also literacy and
health measures. Other intergovernmental organizations, including the
World Health Organization, increasingly rely upon HDI as a development
metric. 7
By contrast, international intellectual property law institutions, such as
the WIPO and the WTO, tend to rely on a "development as growth" model.
This approach, often shared by policymakers from developed countries with
well-entrenched intellectual property industries, tends to view the goal of
international intellectual property as encouraging economic growth,
increasing trade liberalization, promoting foreign direct investment, and
ultimately, enhancing innovation through resulting technology transfer.18
The development as growth framework was initially set by international
development agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank.19
This framework has nonetheless influenced other
institutions-including the WTO and the WIPO-which do not view
development as their central mandate, but which are increasingly under
pressure to consider development in their norm-setting and norminterpreting activities.
The contrasting, and indeed often clashing, understandings of
development lead to very different normative visions of international
intellectual property. The freedom model of development emphasizes not
just the innovation mandate of intellectual property, but also its relation to
other human capability-enhancing social welfare measures, such as access
to education or health,2" which in turn build national capacities for
innovation and growth. The growth model of development, on the other
hand, ties intellectual property unilaterally to its capacity to encourage
innovation through technology transfer, irrespective of intellectual
property's function in other economic and social sectors. The various
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM

128, 134 (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva Kumar eds., 2003);

see also Richard Jolly, Human Development and Neo-liberalism: ParadigmsCompared, in
READINGS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, MEASURES, AND POLICIES FOR
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM 82 (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva Kumar eds., 2003).

A

The standard of living of people is commonly measured by the total amount of
goods and services produced per head of the population, or what is called Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (or Gross National Product (GNP) per capita if
net income from abroad is added). This, in turn, is determined by the number of
people who work, and their productivity.
A.P.

THIRLWALL, DEVELOPMENT AS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE COMPANION
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 41 (Vandana Desai and Robert B. Potter, eds., 2002).

TO

17. See, e.g., WHO, Strategic Resource Allocation, EB188/7, at 14 (May 11, 2006),
availableat http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdffiles/EB 118/B1118 7-en.pdf.
18. Gervais, Intellectual Property, supra note 8, at 516-20; Maskus & Reichman,
supra note 8, at 8-11.

19.

See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,

GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

(2002).

20. See Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice: Toward a New
Paradigmof Health Ethics, Policy andLaw, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (2006).
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debates about the key term "development" within the WTO and the WIPO
underscore the differences between these two models of development."
Throughout the remainder of this Article, we expand upon the insights
of the development as freedom approach for intellectual property.
Intellectual property not only stimulates innovation, but also protects
knowledge goods that enhance human capabilities, which in turn build
national capacities for innovation. Thus, intellectual property should be
deployed as a part of a robust regulatory mix of regulatory approaches
towards various global public goods, including knowledge goods, rather
than as an end in itself.
2. The FirstTrade Puzzle: What Form of Global Governance?
A debate exists in trade scholarship over the WTO's proper role.
Should it adhere strictly to its original mandate of trade liberalization, or
engage in some form of global governance? Sometimes referred to as the
"constitutionalizing of the WTO, 22 the governance question is about the
proper evolution of the global trade regime, from its origins in the GATT to
its current incarnation (at least multilaterally) as the WTO. 23 As recently
observed,
the global trading system has come to require a new telos capable of transcending
the narrow purpose of antiprotection while at the same time connoting a much
broader idea of "integration" that ensures that both trade values and social values
are upheld in a coherent and synergetic, rather than competing fashion. Reflecting
this new teleology, the Preamble of the WTO Charter expresses the ideals of an
"integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system" and "sustainable
development," which certainly go beyond the narrow antiprotectionist motto that
was embedded in the old GATT. In the same context, the Doha Ministerial
Declaration recently reaffirmed the Members' commitment to the objective of
"sustainable development" under which a dual goal of open markets and adequate
social regulation must be "mutually supportive." . . . This "trade constitution,"
in
which is embedded in the very concept of linkage, ' also
24 reveals a new horizon
the field of international trade: "distributional issues.

21. Chon, supra note 6.
22. Jeffrey L. Dunoff provides a summary of the debate and some recent positions in
the scholarly literature. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO's
'Constitution' and the Discipline of InternationalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647 (2006). The
WTO itself is preoccupied with questions of its role and legitimacy, as evidenced by the socalled Sutherland Report. See PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:
ADDRESSING

INSTITUTIONAL

CONSULTATIVE

BOARD

CHALLENGES

TO THE

IN THE NEW

DIRECTOR-GENERAL

MILLENNIUM:

SUPACHAI

REPORT

PANITCHPAKDI

BY THE

(2004),

availableat http://www.wto.org/English/thewtoe/lOanniv-e.pdf.

23.

JOHN

H. BARTON ET AL.,

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW,

AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO

2-5 (2006).

24. Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving beyond
the EntropicDilemma, 5 Cm. J. INT'L L. 625, 646-47 (2005) (citations omitted).
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The governance question includes the debate over the scope of
regulatory harmonization. Should the WTO's mandate include issues other
than the liberalization of trade, or so-called "non-trade issues?"25 The most
contentious of these are environmental, human rights, and labor standards
(sometimes referred to as "fair trade issues"). Intellectual property is often
mentioned as a prototypical example of a domain that involves deep or
positive integration of standards, rather than reduction of tariffs.
Intellectual property was the first of the non-tariff issues to be actually
incorporated within the WTO legal framework, and has now been
institutionalized within the WTO through TRIPS for more than ten years.
Nevertheless, some question whether it is an authentic aspect of the WTO's
core mandate. We discuss this at greater length later on in this Article. We
simply note here that this question of linkage to intellectual property is a
narrow framing of the constitutional question. The Doha Development
Round included within its scope discussions of competition policy and
investment, which are also arguably non-trade-related.26
Points of view about the WTO's capacity to take on a global
governance role fall across a broad spectrum, ranging from celebratory2 7 to
critical.28 In the middle are somewhat skeptical views of constitutionalizing
impetuses within trade scholarship,29 suggesting that, at the end of the day,
there is little support for any actual constitutionalization of the WTO.
Nonetheless, even the discourse of constitutionalism may create not only
heightened expectations, but also an incipient reality of global governance. °
Perhaps this is a claim that the WTO's jurisdiction over non-trade issues is

25. Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 303,
306 (2004) ("The non-trade concerns at issue-sometimes referred to as 'trade and . . .'
issues or 'fair trade' issues-include (at least for the purposes of this Article) human rights,
environmental issues, labor, investment, competition policy, and intellectual property.")
(footnotes omitted).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., id. (pointing to the TRIPS Agreement as a particularly salutary
example of the WTO's institutional capacity and competence to engage in non-trade areas).
28. FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL
THEORY OF JUST TRADE

3-4 (2003) (describing literature inveighing against linkages).

29. Dunoff provides a taxonomy of the different aspects of scholarship in this area:
John Jackson (constitutionalism as institutional architecture); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
(constitutionalism as a set of normative values); Deborah Cass (constitutionalism as judicial
mediation). See Dunoff, supra note 22, at 651-56.
30. Id. at 673-74 (quoting Neil Walker, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, in
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 3, 4 (Neil Walker ed., 2003)) (invoking the term "constitutional
pluralism," coined by Neil Walker, which is "a position which holds that states are no longer
the sole locus of constitutional authority, but are now joined by other sites, or putative sites
of constitutional authority, most prominently... and most relevantly... those situated at the
supra-state level, and that the relationship between state and non-state sites is better viewed
as heterarchical rather than hierarchical").
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inevitable given the lacunae that exist within and among competing forms
of global regulatory interventions. 3'
Regardless of the debate, it is surely not possible now (if it ever was)
to compartmentalize trade and/or intellectual property from other concerns,
including social issues. This may be just a reality of globalization.32 Global
regulation behind domestic borders, such as the minimum intellectual
property standards required by TRIPS, leads directly to consideration of
other social welfare policies.33
Thus, we adopt Thomas Cottier's pragmatic definition of
constitutionalism: constitutionalizing the WTO means "an attitude and a
framework capable of reasonably balancing and weighing different, equally
legitimate and democratically defined basic values and policy goals of a
polity dedicated to promote liberty and welfare in a broad sense."34 This
definition of global governance amplifies the need to balance and weigh the
knowledge goods encouraged by intellectual property with the production of
other global public goods important for human development. In a related
vein, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues for principles of justice to animate the
heretofore formalist interpretations of economic treaties such as the WTO."
31.
See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the
WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 359 (2004) (citations omitted), for a view that
[a]s a practical matter, too, the TRIPs Agreement stands apart from other attempts
to expand the WTO into substantive regulation. Further progress in the trade
regime could not have been made if exporters of intellectual property knew their
property would be taken upon export; these exporters would have had no interest in
having tariffs reduced abroad if their goods could simply be pirated. Yet
intellectual property exporters were key in battling against protectionist groups,
such as textile producers, in the developed world. The TRIPs Agreement was thus
central to the "grand bargain" of the Uruguay Round that made the WTO possible.
In contrast, members of the WTO today seem reluctant to add new subject matters
to the organization.
As the next Subsection of this Article demonstrates, not all commentators agree that TRIPS
belongs in the WTO. See infra Subsection I.A.3.
32. See Emst-Uhich Petersmann, Justice in InternationalEconomic Law? From the
'InternationalLaw Among States' to 'InternationalIntegration Law' and 'Constitutional
Law' 4-7 (European University Institute Working Paper LAW No. 2006/46, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract-964165; see also S. Hobe, Globalisation: A Challenge to the
Nation State and to International Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES:
GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIEs 378, 378-79 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002); L. M.
Friedman, One World: Notes on the Emerging Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESSES supra, at 28-30.
33. See Sean Pager, TRIPS: A Link Too Far? A Proposalfor ProceduralRestraints
on Regulatory Linkage in the WTO, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 215, 237 n.96 (2006)
("Regulatory harmonization can impact a broad gamut of domestic actors having little or no
direct connection to trade. Unlike tariff policies, which primarily affect input prices,
regulatory policies can affect the ability of ordinary citizens to engage in economic and noneconomic activities on many levels.").
34. Thomas Cottier, Limits to InternationalTrade: The ConstitutionalChallenge, 94
AM. SOCY INT'L L. PRocs. 220, 221 (2000).
35. Petersmann, supra note 32, at 7-12.
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. As stated at the outset, this Article is written from the development as
freedom lens. Understanding intellectual property's innovation mandate as
one of many cross-cutting development goals has been under-emphasized
within international intellectual property legal frameworks at the global and
domestic levels. We develop this further in the next Subsection.
3. The Second Trade Puzzle: Linking Trade to IntellectualProperty
What kind of development should the WTO prioritize through
TRIPS?36 Related to this question is the degree of intrusion upon domestic
sovereignty to which member states agreed in TRIPS, in return for greater
access to markets. As mentioned above,37 the debate about whether TRIPS
belongs in trade occurred in part because TRIPS represented the first
instance of a deep integration of standards behind borders (rather than
shallow integration, where the focus is on trade barriers at the borders)38 in
what was arguably a non-trade linkage.
Given the pragmatic observation that non-trade linkages are
inevitable, are they good or bad for development, specifically a model of
development as freedom?
Predictably again, there are a variety of
perspectives, but unpredictably, we find interesting inconsistency among the
positions. Some highly critical of the WTO on the access to medicines
issue have nonetheless posited that intellectual property linkages to trade are
themselves positive for development because they highlight the question of
intellectual property's purpose in relation to social welfare goals other than
innovation.39
Alternatively, this linkage, otherwise dubious, might
legitimize other social or fair trade linkages, which are seen as more
desirable. 0 Others view trade's links to intellectual property as appropriate,
36.

See James Thuo Gathii, Process and Substance in WTO Reform, 56 RUTGERS L.

REV. 885 (2004).
37. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
38. Nancy Birdsall & Robert Z. Lawrence, Deep Integrationand Trade Agreements:
Goodfor Developing Countries?, in GLOBAL PUBLIc GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

INTHE 21ST CENTURY 128 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999); Denis Borges Barbosa, TRIPs art. 7
and 8, FTAs and Trademarks, at 3 nn.7-8, Mar. 9, 2006, available at

http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/documents/Presentation-DenisBorgesBarbosa.pdf?rd=1.
39. Sisule F Musungu, Rethinking Innovation, Development and Intellectual
Property in the UN: WIPO and Beyond 22 (Quaker U.N. Office TRIPS Issues Papers No. 5,
2005), availableat http://www.qiap.ca/pages/documents/TRIPS53.pdf.
From a strategic standpoint, the WTO and TRIPS may have been a blessing in
disguise. Because of TRIPS and the bluntness given to its rules due to the use of
trade-based retaliation measures, civil society has emerged to play a critical role in
the debate on intellectual property and development.... The trade-related concept
introduced by TRIPS has helped other institutions, especially within the UN such
as WHO, to make a relatedness argument as a basis of their work.
Id. (footnote omitted).
40.

JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION

(2000).
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seeing no problem With the trade-relatedness of intellectual property, while
decrying any other trade linkages."
Others are more critical of the
intellectual property linkage, seeing no normative justification from a trade
standpoint, but accepting it nonetheless.42 Still others view the intellectual
property linkage as unacceptable. From their perspectives, intellectual
property is simply not trade-related (in the memorable words of neoliberal
economist Jagdish Bhagwati, TRIPS turns the WTO "into a royalty
collection agency"),43 has an undeniably negative impact on developing
countries by way of innovation and overall social welfare measures, and
should be excised from the WTO."
Our perspective is informed by the development as freedom approach.
Implicit in the WTO's current trade emphasis is a particular view of
development, heavily dominated by the model of development through
economic growth, rather than alternatives such as the development as
freedom model.45 Among the various and not insignificant dangers of
linkage is that the domestic intellectual property balance in member states is
being subverted to global trade ends, such as balance of trade concerns for
intellectual property rich states.46 We also recognize structural concerns and
systemic asymmetry in the dispute resolution process within the WTO.47
TRIPS is the only case of 'positive' linkage of non-trade regulatory standards to
the GATT - where states are required to enforce specified minimum standards. All
other linkages in the history of the GATT have been 'negative.' . . . Whatever we
think of TRIPS, ... the TRIPS principle is right: positive linkage is sometimes
justified. In the contest of law between the GATT and environmental treaties that
are enforceable by trade sanctions, we must accept that some regulatory minimus
are more important than free trade, for us to survive and flourish. Failure to
honour them is an unfair trade advantage that responsible states should not have to
accept.
Id. (citations omitted).
41.
McGinnis & Movsesian, supranote 31, at 359.
42. Cho, supra note 24, at 631.
43. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 182 (2004) ("But
pharmaceutical and software companies muscled their way into the WTO and turned it into a
royalty-collection agency simply because the WTO can apply trade sanctions."); see also
Josd E. Alvarez & Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: A Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
126, 127 (2002).
44.
BHAGWATI, supra note 43, at 182; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON,
FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: How TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT 11-46 (2005).
45. Chon, supra note 6, at 2885.
46. Dreyfuss, TRIPS Round-II, supra note 8, at 21 (describing how "the free traders
who negotiated the GATT worked in an environment in which the core concern, reducing
market barriers, was viewed as producing ... unmitigated welfare gains, [and thus] they
were not likely to appreciate the social importance, in TRIPS, of balancing proprietary
interests against public access needs"); see also Peter Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 143; Chon, supra note 8.
47. Daniel Drache, Trade, Development and the DohaRound: A Sure Bet or a Train
Wreck? 6 (Centre for Int'l Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 5, 2006), availableat
http://www.igloo.org/igloo/community.igloo?rO=communitydownload&r0-script=-/scripts/do

HeinOnline -- 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 82 2007

Spring]

Slouching Towards Development

Perhaps most significantly, free trade agreements (FTAs) and other bilateral
and regional agreements are inexorably increasing intellectual property
minimum standards set through TRIPS.4"
Nonetheless, the jurisprudence of intellectual property within the
WTO may evolve to accommodate intellectual property and development,
understood from a human development perspective. Noting that the
"tension between trade and regulatory failure . . . lies at the center of all
linkage issues,"49 Sungjoon Cho concludes that "[w]hen confronting a
legitimate regulatory concern, one might reasonably posit that domestic
governments should be able to maintain their own regulatory autonomy and
diversity."5 Adopting this approach, any interpretation of TRIPS thus
should give great weight to its built-in flexibilities to address domestic
development concerns, so long as these flexibilities are not being used
primarily as a cover for trade protectionism.' Moreover, the WTO dispute
settlement panels have looked outside of WTO law to other sources of law
for guidance on the meaning of "sustainable development" in the preamble
to the WTO Agreement. 2 Thus, part of our proposed methodology focuses
on WTO jurisprudence. Part II focuses on some underutilized principles of
treaty interpretation that can give fuller effect to the different values struck
in the original TRIPS bargain. 3
We also note that a shift from the WIPO to the WTO for the
enunciation of international intellectual property norms has generated some
positive pressure on the WIPO for norm-setting based on a development as
freedom model. 4 Accordingly, in Section I.B, we shift our focus away
from the WTO to other intellectual property institutions:
B. A Development as Freedom Approach to the International Intellectual
Property Regime Complex
The WTO, however important, is only one of several major players
impacting international intellectual property norm-setting and interpretation.
Thus, before analyzing balance from a development perspective, the overall
cument/download.script&rOfpathinfo=%2F%7B7caf3d23023d494b865b84d 143de9968%7D
%2FPublications%2Fworkingp%2Ftrade-de&rO output=xml&s=cc.
48. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 5, at 437-38, Thl. 13.1 ("TRIPs-plus
obligations in bilateral and regional agreements"); see also infra Part IV.
49. Cho, supra note 24, at 639.
50. Id. at 643.
51. Id. at 655 (citing John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade
Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REv. 511, 566-72 (2000)).
52. Gabrielle Marceau, A Callfor Coherence in InternationalLaw: Praisesfor the
Prohibitionagainst "ClinicalIsolation " in WTO Dispute Settlement, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct.
1999, at 87-152 (arguing in favor of incorporating non-WTO law in WTO DSU decisions).
53. See infraPart II.
54. See infra Part III.
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global landscape should be considered. This legal landscape has been
termed (perhaps infelicitously) the international intellectual property regime
complex (IIPRC). As introduced into the intellectual property academic
literature, the terms "regime" and "regime complex" are, respectively:
Regimes, a term taken from international relations theory, refer to "implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." More
concisely and narrowly, regimes have been defined as "institutions with explicit
rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues" in
international relations. At the core of most regimes is an international treaty. A
regime complex, by contrast, is a collective of partially overlapping and even
inconsistent regimes that are not hierarchically ordered, and which lack a
centralized decisionmaker or adjudicator. Regime complexes may comprise many
agreements and many institutions.

Although the WTO and the WIPO each could be considered a regime
complex by itself, by virtue of administering multiple treaties,56 together
they form an IIPRC. In addition to the WTO and the WIPO (which is a UN
agency as of 1974), many other UN agencies are implicated in or have an
explicit mandate with respect to intellectual property norm-setting,
innovation, and development.17 Current important examples include the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which oversees the intellectual
property-related work on access and benefit-sharing (ABS),i the World
Health Organization (WHO), which includes the Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health (CIPIH),59 and
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which administers the
work of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS). ° These are
only a few of the many intersecting mandates among UN agencies that
touch upon intellectual property.6 However, until TRIPS, the WIPO had
55. Kal Raustiala, Density & Conflict in InternationalIntellectual PropertyLaw, 40
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1021 (2007) (citation omitted), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=914606; see also Peter K. Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrentsin the InternationalIntellectual Property Regime, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 323,
408-17 (2004); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New
Dynamics of InternationalIntellectualPropertyLawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 42 n. 186
(2004).
56. Indeed, perhaps the WIPO could be regarded as a regime complex in and of
itself, as it administers multiple treaties and has had multiple incarnations over its one
hundred year existence, if one counts its initial incarnation as BIRPI. Sisule F Musungu &
Graham Dutfield, Multilateralagreements and a TRIPS-plus world: The World Intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO) 4-10 (Quaker U.N. Office, TRIPS Issues Papers No. 3, 2003),
availableat http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/WIPOMusunguDutfield.pdf.
57. Musungu, supranote 39.
58. Id. at 34.
59. Id. at 28.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id. at 25-35 (listing eighteen "UN bodies and the mandates relevant to
innovation, development, and intellectual property").
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successfully cast itself as the premier, if not the only legitimate, intellectual
property standard-setting organization within the IIPRC.
Related to the concepts of regime and regime complex is that of
"regime-shifting," which is "an attempt to alter the status quo ante by
moving treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting
activities from one international venue to another."62 The WIPO-WTO
institutional division of labor is in flux. 3 Arguably TRIPS threw the
WIPO's hegemony into doubt by allowing developed countries with
powerful intellectual property interests to shift to a more favorable regime
(the trade regime) for norm-setting. 6' However, TRIPS has paradoxically
increased the WIPO's visibility with respect to norm-spreading, if not normsetting, through its 1995 technical cooperation agreement with the WTO to
provide technical assistance to developing countries under article 67 of the
TRIPS agreement.65 Moreover, the WIPO has more financial resources than
the WTO to engage in intellectual property norm-setting activities of any
stripe, by virtue of its revenue from filing fees from the various treaties it
administers. Since the Marrakesh meeting, the WIPO has successfully
concluded the WIPO Copyright Treaty,66 the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty,67 the Patent Law Treaty,6 and, most recently, the
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks.69
Both developed and developing countries appear to be shifting
regimes back again from the WTO to the WIPO. On the one hand, the
International Bureau of the WIPO is moving forward in what could be
62. Heifer, supra note 55 (describing regime-shifting from WIPO to other agencies;
using examples of TRIPs and food, agriculture, public health, biodiversity, and human
rights); Yu, supra note 55, at 408-17 (describing multilateral to bilateral regime shifting as
well as shifting between the WTO and WIPO); Peter Drahos, An Alternative Frameworkfor
the Global Regulation of Intellectual Property Rights, 21 AUSTRIAN J. DEV. STUD. 1, 7
(2005) (shifting from UNCTAD to WIPO); cf BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 40, at
571 (defining forum-shifting and suggesting that it is a game that only the powerful states
can play).
63.

JAYASHREE

WATAL,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS

IN

THE

WTO AND

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 396-402 (2001) (forecasting institutional matters of relevance to
implementation of TRIPS, such as division of authority and competence between the WTO
and WIPO); Musungu & Dutfield, supra note 56, at 16 (focusing on the role of WIPO postTRIPS).
64. Raustiala, supra note 55; Yu, supra note 55, at 408-17; Heifer, supranote 55, at
42 n.186.
65. Agreement Between the WIPO and the WTO, Dec 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754

(1995).
66.
67.

WIPO, Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
WIPO, Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76

(1997).
68. WIPO, Patent Law Treaty, June 2, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047 (2000).
69. WIPO, Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, March 27, 2006,
TLT/R/DC/30,
available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/Singapore/pdf/Singaporetreaty.pdf.
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viewed as TRIPS-plus norm-setting initiatives, such as the draft substantive
patent law treaty in the patent domain through the Standing Committee on
the Law of Patents; 7° the draft broadcasting treaty discussions within the
WIPO's Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR);7 1 as
well as soft law norm-setting activities in the Standing Committee on the
Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs, and Geographical Indications.72
On the other hand, a group of developing countries introduced the
WIPO Development Agenda proposal in 2004."3 After often contentious
discussion, the WIPO member states agreed in June 2007 to forward fortyfive development mandates to the WIPO General Assembly for
consideration at its September 2007 meeting.7 4 Thus, the WIPO continues
to occupy a major role in intellectual property norm-setting with respect to
development, at least vis-A-vis any other alternative contender within the
international UN agency system.75 Part III focuses on the potential of the
WIPO Development Agenda as viewed through the development as
freedom lens.76
Simultaneously, regime-shifting is occurring between multilateral and
bilateral treaty-making settings. The success and legitimacy of the current
70. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty [Clean Text], Sept. 30, 2003,
SCP/10/4, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp 10_4.pdf.
71.
WIPO Revised Draft Basic Proposal for the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of
Broadcasting
Organizations,
July
31,
2006,
SCCR/15/2,
available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr 15/sccrl 5_2.pdf.
72. These soft law norm-setting activities have culminated in the adoption by the
WIPO General Assembly and the Assembly of the Paris Union of three Joint
Recommendations: (1) Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well Known Marks
(1999); (2) Concerning Trademark Licenses (2000); and (3) Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet (2001).
WIPO,
Trademark
Joint
Recommendations,
http://www.wipo.int/aboutip/en/development iplaw/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
73. WIPO, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a
Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/3 1/11 (Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Proposal by
Argentina and Brazil], available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/
govbody/wogbga/pdf/woga_31_11.pdf; see also infra Part III (discussing the
Development Agenda); WIPO, Report, WO/GA/31/15 (Oct. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wogbga/pdf/woga_3 1_15.pdf.
Originally submitted in 2004 by Argentina and Brazil on behalf of the Friends of
Development, it was joined by twelve other member states, including Bolivia, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Tanzania and Venezuela.
74. PCDA Final Recommendations, supra note 2; see also Viviana Munoz Tellez,
The WIPO Development Agenda: The Campaign to Reform International Intellectual
Property Policy-Making 1, available at http://www.ipngos.org/NGO%20Briefings/
The%20WIPO%20Development%2OAgenda.pdf.
75. Sisule F. Musungu, WIPO Development Agenda - As the Dust Settles,
Pondering What is in the Agenda, Whether it is Success or Hot Air, July 9, 2007,
http://thoughtsincolours.blogspot.com/2007/07/wipo-development-agenda-as-dust.htmi. But
see Helfer, supra note 55, at 42.
76. See infra Part III.
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Doha Development Round at the WTO (and perhaps of the multilateral
efforts of the WTO more broadly) are in question."
Given the
disagreements of the Doha Round thus far, the United States and other
intellectual property-rich nations increasingly rely upon bilateral "solutions"
to trade issues, including intellectual property. The WTO's multilateral
solutions, while imperfect, have been giving way to Berne-Plus, TRIPSplus,"8 and even U.S.-plus79 intellectual property standards negotiated
through FTAs.80 As many have noted, these turn the non-discrimination
most-favored nation (MFN) principle of TRIPS into a ratchet-upwards for
rights holders.8 Thus, instead of acting as a ceiling, as had been expected
by many in developing countries, the multilateral instrument of TRIPS is
now a floor for harmonized standards. FTAs are used as a vehicle for
elevating the so-called "minimum standards" of TRIPS. Widespread
recognition of this one-way process has resulted in calls for "substantive

77. See Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Doha Round Negotiation:Suspended Indefinitely,
AM.
SOC'Y
INT'L L. INSIGHTS,
Sept.
5, 2006,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/09/insights0609O5.html; Sandra Polaski, The Future of the WTO 2 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Sept. 2006), available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/PolaskiWTOfinal-formatted.pdf.
78. "TRIPS-Plus" refers to bilateral agreements or regional multilateral agreements,
often denominated as "free trade agreements," in which minimum standards that exceed the
TRIPS minimum standards are negotiated, which often have the effect of reducing the
flexibilities and policy space of developing countries. Examples of this include article 17.5
of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, which requires copyright term of life of the author
plus seventy years. This exceeds the requirements of article 9 of TRIPS (incorporating
Berne Convention article 7(1)), which establishes a term of life of the author plus fifty years.
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, Art. 17.5, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026
(2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html; see generally Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and
Reaction: Developments and Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 31-33 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds.,
2006) (describing various restrictions in regulatory flexibility resulting from free trade
agreements negotiated by the U.S.).
79. Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Provisionsof Bilateral and Regional
Trade Agreements in Light of US. Federal Law 1, 9, 11 (Int'l Centre for Trade and
Sustainable
Dev.,
Issue
Paper
No.
12,
Feb.
2006),
available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20064_en.pdf (describing several examples of U.S.-plus
standards adopted by other countries because of the narrower scope of exceptions to the U.S.
standard allowed by the bilateral agreement than would be available under U.S. law).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
81. See, e.g., Drahos, supra note 62, at 7. Professor Drahos explains:
Each new bilateral agreement that sets higher standards of intellectual property is
picked up by the MFN principle of TRIPS. The savings of MFN become
significant as more states enter into agreements with the US. If, for example, 29
states each enter into a bilateral agreement with the US that contains the same
provisions on intellectual property, the MFN principle spreads those standards
amongst all the states. Without MFN, 435 [separate] agreements would be needed.
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maxima"2 or international exceptions and limitations,83 in order to maintain
some sort of overall balance between the interests of intellectual property
producers and users. Part IV addresses this phenomenon of "upwardly
mobile minimum standards" through a discussion of emerging international
law human rights norms, as well as the full application of the nonderogation and freedom of implementation principles to limit the impact of
FTAs on the original bargain struck in TRIPS.' 4
Of course, no discussion of the IIPRC is complete without
acknowledging that non-nationalization 5 and private ordering 6 contribute
to the proliferation of international lawmaking sites. 7 Increasingly as well,
international intellectual property norms influence national intellectual
property norm development, and vice versa, creating a law-making
reflexivity across territorial boundaries. 8
Finally, the increasingly
important role of NGOs is overwhelmingly obvious in light of the debate
over access to pharmaceuticals and the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health. 9

82. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 220-21 (advocating the use of
"substantive maxima" to preserve an international public domain of knowledge).
83. WIPO, PCDA, Proposal by Chile, PCDA/1/2 (Jan. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda 1/pcda_12.pdf;
WIPO,
Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights [SCCR], Proposalby Chile on the Analysis of
Exceptions and Limitations, SCCR/13/5
(Nov.
22,
2005),
available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr13/sccr 13_5.pdf,
WIPO,
SCCR,
Proposal by Chile on the Subject "Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright and Related
Rights", SCCR/12/3 (Nov. 2, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
copyright/en/sccr_12/sccr123.pdf.
84. See infra Part IV.
85. Yu, supra note 55, at 401-02 (describing non-nationalization as a "network
model [that] has now replaced the patchwork model that countries traditionally used to
structure international intellectual property norms in the past century" and discussing the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy as an example).
86. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of International
Copyright Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 161, 178 (2004).
87. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The InternationalIntellectual Property System:
Treaties,Norms, National Courts, and PrivateOrdering,in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE
& DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA
(D. Gervais ed., 2007).
88. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON
NATIONAL COPYRIGHT POLICY: A SURPRISINGLY RICH PICTURE (2007), available at
http://works.bepress.com/graeme dinwoodie/43/; Daniel Gervais, The Role of International
Treaties in the Interpretationof CanadianIntellectual PropertyStatutes, in THE GLOBALIZED
RULE OF LAW: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW (Oonagh
Fitzgerald ed., 2006).
89. See MATTHEWS, supra note 14; Susan K. Sell, Books, Drugs and Seeds: The
Politics of Access 53, 59 (Mar. 20, 2006) (unpublished paper presented to Trans Atlantic
Consumer
Dialogue,
available
at
http://www.tacd.org/events/intellectualproperty/index.htm).
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Thus, the success of intellectual property-rich countries in
implementing specific intellectual property strategies is due not only to their
ability to shift back and forth between the WTO and the WIPO frameworks,
but also between the multilateral and bilateral frameworks. It also depends
heavily on the insularity of all norm-setting organizations towards
foundational understandings of development. Many developing countries,
in particular, contend with a lack of policy coordination within and between
the national and international levels, combined with growing complexity
and fragmentation of policy-making venues.9 ° This is part of what has been
termed a "knowledge trap" for poor countries, which are severely and
systematically penalized by the knowledge-intensity demanded by the deep
integration of standards within the IIPRC.9 Opportunities have increased
for meaningful developing country participation in the IIPRC, whether
through intergovernmental organizations92 or NGOs.93 At the same time,
international level efforts may be disconnected from national level
implementation of TRIPS or other intellectual property treaties; from
national level coordination of intellectual property policy-making with other
relevant ministries; or even from negotiation of bilateral trade agreements
within national capitals.94 As Sisule Musungu and Graham Dutfield
recently stated, "it is imperative, if developing countries are going to
influence negotiations at WIPO towards a development orientation, that the
issue of representation in WIPO negotiations and coordination both
nationally and in Geneva (WTO and WIPO) be discussed and resolved."9 5
Given this flux, a re-examination of institutional roles, structures, and
legal tools from the perspective of development is timely. For example, one
of the WIPO Development Agenda recommendations includes "[t]o request
WIPO to intensify its cooperation on IP related issues with UN agencies,
according to Member States' orientation, in particular UNCTAD, UNEP,
WHO, UNIDO, UNESCO and other relevant international organizations,
especially WTO in order to strengthen the coordination for maximum
efficiency in undertaking development programs."96 This echoes earlier

90. Ahmed Abdel Latif, Developing Country Coordination in International
IntellectualPropertyStandard-Setting 1 (South Centre, Working Papers No. 24, June 2005),
availableat http://www.southcentre.org/publications/workingpapers/wp24.pdf.
91.
Sylvia Ostry, After Doha: Fearful New World?, BRIDGES, Aug. 2006, at 3,
availableat http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES 10-5.pdf.
92. BARTON ET AL., supra note 23, at 172-74.
93.

MATTHEWS, supra note 14.

94. See Denis Borges Barbosa, New Semiconductor Chip Protection Act in Brazil,
Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=46352&lastestnews=l.
95. Musungu & Dutfield, supra note 56, at 22.
96. PCDA FinalRecommendations, supranote 2, annex 40.
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reform proposals made by those with a deep understanding of Geneva-based
norm-setting.97
This Article does not focus on global institutional reform per se to
address development and IIPRC balance.98 Nonetheless, to encourage
development-oriented intellectual property, multiple macro (structural) and
micro (legal doctrinal) approaches are necessary. This observation relates
back to the previous Section, which addressed the question of WTO global
governance. We posit that a global governance approach not just by the
WTO, but also by the entire IIPRC, is required in order to adequately
address intellectual property-driven development.
C. Locating the International Intellectual Property Balance: Towards
Development in International Intellectual Property
The WIPO Development Agenda explicitly embraces the classic
domestic balance between exclusive rights and access to knowledge goods,
in its nine "Cluster B" recommendations on "Norm-Setting, Flexibilities,
Public Policy and Public Domain." For example, references to "the public
domain," "flexibilities" and "access to knowledge" appear.99 On the WTO
side of the IIPRC, however, Graeme Dinwoodie claims that there are
currently three types of balance in international intellectual property:
TRIPS still relied heavily on national political processes to ensure appropriate
balance. If one is to find balance embedded in the TRIPS context, it can only be
found by recognizing that in return for accepting restrictions on national autonomy
to maintain unduly low levels of intellectual property protection, developing
countries secured benefits in terms of market access and technology transfer. That
is, the balance embodied in the 1994 WTO agreements was not a balance intrinsic
to intellectual property law, which we find in the domestic political context, nor
97.
Musungu & Dutfield, supra note 56, at 18-24 (advocating, among other things,
operationalizing the Agreement between WIPO and the UN, specifically the language of
article One ("WIPO's role is subject to the competence and responsibilities of the UN and its
organs particularly UNCTAD[,] . . . UNDP[,] . . . UNIDO[,] . . . [and] UNESCO"),
manifesting a deeper commitment to its role as a UN specialized agency whose "purposes
must be compatible with those of the UN and its agencies," and making far greater efforts to
consult and cooperate with other UN organs and agencies).
98. Cf Gerhart, supra note 46.
99. PCDA Final Recommendations, supra note 2, annex
15-22. See also Part III
and text accompanying note 237. This language of balance was explicitly invoked in the
WCT preamble: "Recognizing the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors
and the larger public interest, particularly education, research and access to information, as
reflected in the Berne Convention." WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION
COPYRIGHT TREATY, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at 4, 36 I.L.M. 65, 68 (1996). As
Dinwoodie astutely points out, the Berne Convention does not refer to balance and probably
historically was not much concerned with balance, at least on the international level. Graeme
B. Dinwoodie, The Global Politics of Intellectual Property 3 (June 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) ("Implicit in the celebration of that balance language in 1996
is the fact that international intellectual property treaties historically did not explicitly seek to
strike a particular substantive balance.").
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even a balance that also figured in the right mix of universal standards versus
national autonomy, which we find in the classical international intellectual
property. Rather, TRIPS added a third vector: policy objectives secured by00 a
balance of intellectual property rights and other tools of economic development.

If this is an accurate assessment, then this third type of balance, the
non-classical international one, requires the greatest theoretical and
doctrinal exposition at this historical moment. Does it simply mean that any
particular developing country may simply choose to balance the adoption of
greater standards of intellectual property in exchange for greater market
access to textiles and food, in the pursuit of overall social welfare? Or does
the third vector include a balance of the innovation goal of intellectual
property against various other social welfare goals, such as public health, on
a global level?
We argue here that international intellectual property balance must be
calibrated to assist in the achievement of global human development goals.
Given that TRIPS could just as easily be characterized as a rule of law
project as a free trade agreement,"0 ' its minimum standards ought to be
interpreted in a manner that recognizes the obstacles posed by overly high
and rigid intellectual property standards to human development. As
recently stated,
As viewed by proponents, TRIPS prohibits nations from "free riding" by acquiring
at low cost the products developed in other nations, and thus not paying the higher
prices that allow for recovery of research or development cost. As seen by critics it
threatens development by slowing the spread of technology, hampering the ability
of developing countries to compete in markets where the industrial world already
has an advantage, and failing to stimulate innovation in the world's poorer
countries. But both agree that the main effect of the agreement is to protect rents
in profitable activities. The thrust of the TRIPS is therefore very different from the
notion of "driving out" rents by the steady reduction of protection at the border.10 2

TRIPS not only was a turning point with respect to linkage bargaining,
allowing states to bargain intellectual property for other trade "chips," such
as access to agricultural markets (for example, DVD protection for apples).
100. Dinwoodie, supranote 99, at 3; see also Dinwoodie, supra note 87.
101. BARTON ET AL., supra note 23, at 142; see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYsIs 81 (2d ed. 2003).
Several paragraphs of the preamble thus confirm the need for achieving a balance,
or, perhaps more accurately, the need to arrive at a series of equilibriums between
intellectual property protection and free trade (bearing in mind that, prior to the
Uruguay Round, intellectualproperty was viewed as an exception to free trade in
Art. XX(d) in GATT); between highly industrialized and developing nations;
between the private rights of intellectual property owners and cases where the
public interest may trump some aspects of the protection of intellectual property;
and more broadly as a reflection of the 'contract' that intellectual property
represents ....
Id.(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
102. BARTON ET AL., supranote 23, at 142.
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TRIPS also clearly articulates the space for member states to balance
internally the innovation goal of intellectual property along with other
development goals, such as promotion of public health, through articles 7
and 8. The TRIPS preamble clearly references "the underlying public
policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual
property, including developmental and technological objectives... ."103 As
Graeme Austin has argued in a slightly different context, intellectual
property values are an instantiation of domestic self-determination that
ought to be expressed as "aspects of much broader issues of public policy..
. .that help ensure that populations get fed, enjoy the benefits of literacy,
are healthy, have viable agricultural bases, and can participate in
technological and cultural development...."104
TRIPS, via articles 7 and 8, was intended to import a normative
"balance" approach into international intellectual property law."0 5 The
explicit "Objectives" of TRIPS, articulated in article 7, include:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.'°6

This article 7 "balance" language has now been incorporated by
reference in the WIPO Development Agenda,"°7 and as Barbosa has
previously argued, article 7 should:
be read as an interpretative tool before everything, in a way conducive to the
technology transfer; but... stress[ing] especially the balanced nature of the overall
agreement.... The necessary balancing to the constitutionality of the IPRs as it is
developed in the Constitutional discourse in many relevant countries appears
10 8 in
TRIPS, preventing the exclusive protection of the interests of the IPRs owners.

Furthermore, among the "Principles" of TRIPS articulated by article 8
is the ability of members to "adopt measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
103. TRIPS, supra note 4, pmbl.
104. Graeme W. Austin, Valuing "Domestic Self-Determination" in International
Intellectual PropertyJurisprudence,77 CHL-KENT L. REv. 1155, 1193 (2002).
105. GERVAIS, supra note 101, at 81.
106. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 7.
107. PCDA Final Recommendations, supra note 2, annex
45 ("To approach
intellectual property enforcement in the context of broader societal interests and especially
development oriented concerns, with a view that 'the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations,' in accordance with Article 7 of the
TRIPS Agreement.").
108. Barbosa, supra note 38, at 5-6 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see also
infra note 145.
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importance to their socio-economic and technological development."' 9
Referring to articles 7 and 8, Moncayo von Hase has stated that local
"freedom to introduce exceptions or limitations on public ground or to adopt
measures to counter abuses on the part of IPRs rightsholders w[as] partly
conceived to attenuate the social costs that developing countries must
absorb in order to bring their national IPRs system in line with TRIPs
standards."'"
One might argue that member states accepted intrusions on
sovereignty accompanying the deep linkages of intellectual property
minimum standards, without demanding corresponding shields on this
intrusion through, for example, the language of "rights of development""'
or through mandatory exceptions and limitations. Articles 7 and 8, which
reference the developmental objectives of TRIPS, are couched in the less
definite language of "should" or "may" whereas the minimum standards of
TRIPS are stated in the mandatory language of "shall."" 2
For several reasons, we find this position to be less than compelling.
Pre-existing international intellectual property treaties upon which the
TRIPS treaty was modeled, such as the Beme Convention, specified the
rights associated with intellectual property but left the ambit of other rights
associated with the public interest up to the discretion of member states to
mold as they see fit within certain broadly outlined parameters." 3 However,
it does not follow that a balance of development goals within the TRIPS
treaty structure is irrelevant, particularly when specific treaty text
referencing balance and development exists.
Furthermore, the negotiating history indicates that the preambular
language, as well as articles 7 and 8, were the product of vigorous debate
about the role of intellectual property in development. The initial text was
suggested by the so-called "Group of 14" developing countries." 4 The
109. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 8.
110. Moncayo von Hase, The Application and Interpretationof the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 137 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A.
Yusuf eds., 1998).
111. See generally Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between
Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 137 (2004).
112. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 9 ("Members shall comply with Articles 1
through 21 of the Berne Convention ....
");TRIPS, supranote 4, art. 27 ("[P]atents shall be
available....").
113. Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions
and Public Interest Considerationsfor Developing Countries 2, (Int'l Centre for Trade and
Sustainable
Dev.,
Issue
Paper
No.
15,
Mar.
2006),
available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf.
114. Adronico 0. Adede, Origins and History of the TRIPS Negotiations, in TRADING
IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 25, 28
(Christope Bellmann et al. eds., 2003); Daniel J.Gervais, IntellectualProperty,supra note 8,
at 508-09.
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Group of 14 pushed to include this language referencing development after
it became inevitable that intellectual property rights were to be included in
By presenting their own text, these
the global trading framework."'
countries wanted
to highlight the importance of the public policy objectives underlying national IPR
[Intellectual Property Rights] systems, the necessity of recognizing those
objectives at the international level and. .. the need to respect and safeguard
needs and
national legal systems and traditions on IPRs, in view of the diverse
6
levels of development of states participating in the IPR negotiations."1

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the interpretative context for
these articles has changed significantly since 1996 when TRIPS came into
force and indeed even since the initial DSU decisions interpreting articles 7
and 8.' According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions""' or "any subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation"" 9 shall be taken into account in treaty
interpretation. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 2 ' the
[T]he emerging outline of a possible TRIPS result had essentially been at the level
of principles, not legal texts. The draft legal texts, which emanated from the
European Community, the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and Australia,
foreshadowed a detailed agreement covering all IP rights then in existence,... As
a reaction, more than a dozen developing countries proposed another "legal" text,
much more limited in scope, with few specific normative aspects. They insisted on
the need to maintain flexibility to implement economic and social development
objectives. In retrospect, some developing countries may feel that the Uruguay
Round Secretariat did them a disservice by preparing a "composite" text, which
melded all industrialized countries' proposals into what became the "A" proposal,
while the developing countries' text became the "B" text. The final Agreement
mirrored the "A" text. As such, it essentially embodied norms that had been
accepted by industrialized countries. The concerns of developing countries were
reflected in large part in two provisions-Articles 7 and 8.
Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property,supranote 8, at 508(footnotes omitted).
115. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3, 10-14
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
116. Adede, supra note 114, at 28.
117. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection,
WT/DS 170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000) (discussed infra Part II).
118. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(May 23, 1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also ANTHONY AuST, MODERN TREATY
LAW AND PRACTICE 191 (2000).
119. Vienna Convention, supranote 118, art. 31(3)(b); AUST, supra note 118, at 19495.
120. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health] (affirming "WTO members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all")
(emphasis added).
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Doha Declaration,' the 2003 General Council Decision, 2 2 and proposed
article 31bis'23 all comprise subsequent legal agreements or practices that
highlight the importance of "development" as a key legal term of art within
the original TRIPS text. The new WIPO Development Agenda reinforces
even more profoundly this development tilt in global intellectual property.
Moreover, the overall context for interpretation should arguably account for
the development focus of the Doha Round itself, 24 and even the explicit
25
human development approach of the UN Millennium Development Goals.
In Part II below, we discuss a principle of evolutive interpretation that takes
into account this changing context.
Yet at the same time, balance of any kind in the IIPRC seems
increasingly elusive, both as an empirical and even a normative matter.
Intellectual property, as the de jure and de facto form of regulation of
innovative activity, connects powerfully to an often one-sided rhetoric of
exclusionary rights.'26 The previous Section described regime-shifting
moves by industrialized countries to instruments such as FTAs, or venues
such as the G8, which have exacerbated the lack of balance in the IIPRC.
While developing countries have responded by shifting regimes to human
rights frameworks, this does not automatically counteract the powerful
27
property rights discourse wielded by intellectual property rights holders.
121. Note that two separate Doha Ministerial Declarations were issued on November
14, 2001. The one referenced herein as the "Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health"
was specific to the issue of TRIPS and public health. The other, referenced herein as the

"Doha Declaration," more generally addressed the objectives of the so-called "Doha
development round." See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746

17-19 (2002) [hereinafter Doha

Declaration]. Paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration explicitly links the TRIPS Council
review of specific activities to "the objectives and principles set out in articles 7 and 8 of the
TRIPS Agreement and" directs the TRIPS Council to "take fully into account the
development dimension." Id. 19.
122. Decision of the General Council, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003),

http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips e/implempara6_e.htm

[hereinafter

General

Council Decision] (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).

123.

Council

for Trade-Related

Aspects

of Intellectual

Property

Rights,

Implementation of Paragraph11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the
Implementation of Paragraph6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
PublicHealth, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005).

124. BARTON ET AL., supra note 23, at 168-69.
Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non125. "Target 12.
discriminatory trading and financial system [sic] Includes a commitment to good governance,
development, and poverty reduction - both nationally and internationally." UN Millennium
Target
12,
Goal
8,
and
Indicators,
Goals,
Targets,
Development
http://www.undp.org/mdg/goallist.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
126. See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, REFORMING U.S. PATENT POLICY: GETTING THE

RIGHT (Council on Foreign Relations, CSR No. 19, 2006).
127. Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human
Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1039 (2007); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a
INCENTIVES
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Indeed, there is a certain similarity between the rhetoric of balance
within the IIPRC and the way development functions rhetorically as part of
the WTO's mandate. International intellectual property "balance" and
international "development" both are nominally recognized. But in both
cases, they are embedded within a model of economic growth, which then
makes any alternative interpretations (based, for example, on a human
development model) difficult to articulate. Within trade law generally,
recognizing the special problem of development has traditionally been a
challenge.12
Yet any development-oriented approach necessitates
differentiating among differently situated member states.'29
Regulatory harmonization of intellectual property rules across
countries varying widely in their levels of development demonstrates the
very real costs, and somewhat dubious benefits, of implementation. 3 ' From
the perspective of many developing countries, capacity building has been
about building capacity for compliance with top-down intellectual property
legal regimes, not about building capacity from the bottom up, that is, from
the local context for innovation based on human development needs."'
Two primary tools for development within the traditional trade framework
are special and differential treatment (S&DT), endorsed by the developed
countries, and technical assistance, typically endorsed by developing
countries.'32 These two tools have neither been sufficient, nor sufficiently
implemented, for purposes of development within the intellectual property
context.'33 S&DT is implemented in TRIPS solely through the transition
Human Rights Frameworkfor Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007)
(analyzing General Comment 17, which interprets ICESCR Article 15(1)(c)); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where is the Paradox? (N.Y. Univ., Law and
Economics
Research Paper No. 06-38,
forthcoming
2007),
available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=929498.
128. Broude, supra note 3, at 6.
129. Broude, supra note 3, at 35.
130.
PROPERTY

COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 137, ch. 7 (2002), available at

http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/finalreport/CIPRflillfinal.pdf

[hereinafter
supra note 44, at 48
(reporting that US $30 million was required for Mexico to implement an IPR enforcement
system with questionable benefits).
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS]; STIGLITZ & CHARLTON,

131.

INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 130, at 137, ch. 7;

Michel Kostecki, Intellectual Property and Economic Development: What Technical
Assistance to Redress the Balance in Favor of Developing Nations? (ICTSD Issue Paper No.
14, Mar. 2006), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Kostecki%20%201P%20Economic%2oDevelopment/o20-%20Blue%2014.pdf.
132. Daniel D. Bradlow, Differing Conceptions of Development and the Content of
InternationalDevelopment Law, 21 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. (2005), available at www.ssm.com,
abstract=788070.
133. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 66.1 ("Least-Developed Country Members"). S&DT is
implemented in TRIPS via the transition periods for the LDCs to implement their obligations
under Article 66.2; the TRIPS General Council extended this time to 2016.
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periods for the LDCs to implement their obligations under article 66; the
TRIPS General Council extended this time to 2016.3 This Uruguay Round
model departs from the traditional S&DT of non-reciprocal trade
concessions by developed countries; TRIPS establishes uniform regulatory
baselines that are modifiable by time of acceptance, but are not otherwise
subject to differentiation.'35 Technical assistance has received relatively
little attention in the literature, and arguably has not been operationalized
beyond the exporting of intellectual property norms, although it has been
institutionalized within the TRIPS framework. 3 6 Under the development as

growth model, technology transfer is supposed to occur as a by-product of
foreign direct investment, encouraged by the adoption of intellectual
property minimum standards and aided by technical assistance. Yet, so far
the evidence is mixed at best.'37

Current approaches to trade and development, even outside of
intellectual property, emphasize balancedrules. This means assessments of
costs and benefits, preservation of flexibility, and transparency of
By contrast to what is demanded by these new
development impact.'
approaches, however, there seems to be a hardening of the arteries within
the international intellectual property framework. Formalistic norm-setting
and norm-interpretation is a problem, even for developed countries with

134. Press Release, WTO, Council approves LDC decision with additional waiver
(June 28, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres02_e/pr30l-e.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2007).
TREBILCOCK&HOWSE, supra note 5, at 34-35, 501-502.
135.
136. TRIPS, supra note 4, at art. 66.2, 67 ("Technical Cooperation"), and 69
("International Cooperation") address technical assistance and technology transfer. See
Duncan Matthews & Viviana Munoz-Tellez, Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The
United States, Japan and European Communities in ComparativePerspective, 9 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 629, 649-50 (2006) (analyzing article 67 technical assistance efforts from
1996-2005; concluding that while subtle differences exist among the U.S., the EU and
Japanese approaches to technical assistance, relatively few activities focus on articles 7 and
8, or on flexibilities.); Kristen M. Koepsel, How Do Developed Countries Meet Their
Obligations Under Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement? 44 IDEA 167 (2004) (describing
difficulty in meeting reporting requirements of Article 67 as well as technology transfer
requirements under article 66.2); Okediji, supra note 113, at 5 ("The failure to obtain an
international agreement on technology transfer occasioned acknowledgements within TRIPS
of the freedom of countries to interfere with abuses of intellectual property rights that
adversely affect, inter alia, technology transfer.") (footnotes omitted).
137. Gervais, Intellectual Property, supra note 8, at 516-20; Maskus & Reichman,
supra note 8, at 8-11.
138. Faizel Ismail, MainstreamingDevelopment in the World Trade Organization, 39
J. WORLD TRADE 11, 12 (2005). This type of balanced development approach seems to have
been endorsed within the new WIPO Development Agenda. PCDA FinalRecommendations,
supra note 2, annex 15 ("Norm-setting activities shall: be inclusive and member driven;
take into account different levels of development; take into consideration a balance between
costs and benefits; .... ").
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well-established intellectual property industries.'39 Intellectual property is
represented as being in the social welfare interests of all countries, in a
formal equality sense. Yet any robust innovation policy should consider
other means and forms of regulation. Developing countries arguably need
the most flexibility in this regard.
The remainder of this Article outlines three specific legal proposals to
mainstream meaningfully development and balance within the IIPRC. Part
II focuses on expanding the role of TRIPS articles 7 and 8 within WTO
jurisprudence. Part III examines the potential impact of a substantive
equality principle 4 on the WIPO Development Agenda. Part IV discusses
the role of emerging human rights norms as well as international law
principles such as non-derogation and freedom of implementation.
These proposals are offered to restore domestic and global balance in
the face of what we perceive to be the hardening IIPRC imbalance.
II. TRIPS AND PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
The balancing role of articles 7 and 8 has not received full support in
the WTO case law. The WTO Appellate Body's analysis in CanadaPatent Protection of PharmaceuticalProducts, Complaint by the European
Communities and their Member States (hereinafter Canada-Patent
Protection of PharmaceuticalProducts) is not.definitive, which even the
Appellate Body itself recognized at the time:
101. [W]e note that our findings in this appeal do not in any way prejudge the
applicability of Article 7 or Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement in possible future
cases with respect to measures to promote the policy objectives of the WTO
Members that are set out in those Articles. Those Articles still await appropriate

interpretation. 141

Achieving a proper balance within the HPRC necessarily involves
assessing how the pertinent adjudicatory bodies are interpreting the relevant
legal texts. For all practical purposes, the most relevant bodies in this
context are those established by the WTO. Therefore, we analyze the
evolving nature of WTO case law and suggest applicable principles, in
connection with general principles of treaty interpretation, including those
developed by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
applicable jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as well
as the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the Dispute
139. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochell C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
IntellectualPropertyLawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 96 (2004).
140. Chon, supra note 6; see also Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property 'from
Below": Copyright and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 803 (2007)
[hereinafter Chon, IntellectualProperty 'from Below ']; Chon, supranote 8.
141. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection,
101,
WT/DS170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
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Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. Furthermore, although not a dispute
settlement decision, the Ministerial Conference in Singapore emphasized
the importance of the preamble in the Declaration adopted on December 13,
1996: "For nearly 50 years Members have sought to fulfil, first in the GATT
and now in the WTO, the objectives reflected in the preamble to the WTO
Agreement of conducting our trade relations with a view to raising
'
We also explore the general nature of
standards of living worldwide."142
interpretation of international texts, including the role of principles versus
rules.
A. The Principle of In ClarisNon Fit Interpretatioversus the Principle of
Integration
Thus far, the WTO case law reveals a restrictive interpretive approach
towards the TRIPS agreement. Many have been critical of this approach,
which is based on an aggressively textual 4 a and one-sided view of the
objectives and principles of TRIPS.'" For example, Robert Howse states:
The recent decision of a WTO panel, in the Canadian Generic Medicines case,
however, ignores [Article 7's] words about balance and mutual advantage [and
may] .... have very harmful impacts, particularly on developing countries ....
Even though it was dealing with an explicit "exceptions" provision,
comprehensible only if there are legitimate, competing policy interests, the Panel
was only interested in how much the rights holder might lose, not in how much
what scope the
society might gain, from a given exception. It never asked
1 45
exception might require to achieve the social purpose at issue.

The general framework for treaty interpretation is governed by articles
31'" and 32141 of the VCLT. The International Court of Justice displays

142. World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December
1996, 2, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997). See also Petersmann, supra note 32
(emphasizing general principles of justice).
143. Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats:
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J.
WORLD TRADE 191, 206 (2001) (observing the "almost obsessive attempts of the Appellate
Body to characterize ... interpretations of the Agreement as 'textual').
144. See Edwin Cameron, Patents And Public Health: Principle, Politics And
Paradox, 1 SCRIPT- ed: ONLINE 517 (2004), http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/scripted/issue4/Cameron.pdf; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 5.
145. Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous
Precedentin Dangerous Times, 3 J.WORLD INTELL. PROP. 493-96 (2002).
146. Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 31. Article 31 reads:
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
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special reliance upon such interpretative principles. 4 ' Within the WTO's
explicit decision-making framework, article 3.2 of the DSU refers to the
"customary rules of interpretation of public international law,"'49 which are
understood as those rules incorporated in the VCLT. For example, the
WTO panel in India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products explicitly relied on GATT acquis,

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
Id.
147. Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 32. Article 32 reads:
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Id.
148. In doing so, it seeks in the first place to determine the usual and natural meaning
of the words in their context, without, however, sticking too closely to the particular rules
applicable under the procedural law of any legal system, and in that regard frequently refers
to article 31 of the VCLT. "[A]n international instrument has to be interpreted and applied
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation."
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 92 (5th ed. 2004), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibleubook.pdf (citing Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 21 (June
1971)).
149. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 3(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
availableat http://www.wto.org/English/docse/legal e/28 dsu.pdf. Art. 3(2) states that
[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements.
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customary rules of interpretation of public international law and,
5
specifically, article 31 of the VCLT."'
However, the WTO's Appellate Body has generally given high
priority to treaty text. For example, in United States-ImportProhibitionof
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,the Appellate Body stated:
The Panel did not follow all of the steps of applying the "customary rules of
interpretation of public international law" as required by Article 3.2 of the DSU.
As we have emphasized numerous times, these rules call for an examination of the
ordinary meaning of the words of a treaty, read in their context, and in the light of
the object and purpose of the treaty involved. A treaty interpreter must begin with,
and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted.... Where the
meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where
confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired,5 light from
the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.'

As applied in the TRIPS context, the WTO dispute settlement panel in
Products reiterated this
Canada-PatentProtection of Pharmaceutical
52
principle of in claris nonfit interpretatio:1
Thus, the correct approach was to focus first on the text of the provisions to be
interpreted read in its context and to discern from this the intention of the parties to
150. Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural
ChemicalProducts,WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998). The basic methodology is set out in Panel
Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Productsfrom
Japan, 7.27, WT/DS184/R (Feb. 28, 2001).
As the Appellate Body has repeatedly stated, panels are to consider the
interpretation of the WTO Agreements, including the AD Agreement, in
accordance with the principles set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (the "Vienna Convention"). Thus, we look to the ordinary meaning of the
provision in question, in its context, and in light of its object and purpose. Finally,
we may consider the preparatory work (the negotiating history) of the provision,
should this be necessary or appropriate in light of the conclusions we reach based
on the text of the provision.
Id.
151. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp
andShrimpProducts, 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (citations omitted).
152. "In clarity there is no room for interpretation" (translated from Latin). In
connection with this rule, it might be remarked that clarity presumes community of ground
between legislator and interpreter at a very considerable level, which time and cultural
elements can easily deny. For instance, authors have indicated that the clear interpretation of
TRIPS article 27.1 at its inception excluded business methods as patentable matter; but soon
after the WTO initial term, changes in U.S. case law brought about this matter as covered by
the patent laws; the fact that other Members would not follow this understanding should not
attract undue discrimination charges (perhaps the contrary should be held true, from a
societal point of view). As to the scope of the non-discrimination rule of TRIPS article 27,
see Denis B. Barbosa 0 principio de ndo-discriminagdo em propriedade intelectual, in
Usucapiao de Patentes e Outros Estudos de PropriedadeIndustrial, LUMEN JURIS, 2006.
Legal culture also may influence the clarity standard, as, for instance, common-law
practitioners could be attracted to an historical interpretation, always politically useful when
interpreting the actual bargain among the contracting parties, but not accepted as a primary
means of interpretation in Continental legal systems.
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an agreement. It was only if this left a doubt that it was53appropriate to seek
enlightenment from the object and purpose of the agreement.'

This panel opposed the use of the object and purpose of TRIPS, as
also stated in its preamble, as interpretative tools to the document.
Canada claimed to be interpreting Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement in context
when it invoked the first recital to the Preamble and Articles 1.1 and 7 of the
TRIPS Agreement. It was clear that the whole text of an agreement, including the
preamble, formed part of the context of a provision of that agreement. However,
the above provisions were not in reality being invoked by Canada as context to
discern the ordinary meaning of the terms used in Article 30, but as expressions of
object and purpose. The arguments drawn from these provisions by Canada all
related to the supposed object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement and
54 not to
contextual guidance as to the meaning of the terms of Article 30 thereof.
The Canada-PatentProtection of PharmaceuticalProducts panel's

interpretative method does not conform to mainstream treaty interpretation,
which includes the principle of integration: The whole treaty shall be read
together, rather than with a focus on a single provision, however clearly
that provision may shine in isolation. 5 5 Indeed, a counter-example to the
panel's method exists within the intellectual property jurisprudence of the
WTO: A different panel interpreting TRIPS, the United States-Section

110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act panel, adopted this integration principle,
stating "that the text of the treaty must of course be read as a whole. One
cannot simply concentrate on a paragraph, an article, a section, a chapter or
1 56
a part."'

The whole treaty includes, perhaps especially, the stated objects and
purposes of the document. An essential part of a treaty is its preamble.'57
As to the relevance of external sources, the treaty segment under inspection
should be read together with the whole body of relevant international law,
both at the moment of the inception of the treaty and at the moment when
the interpretation is performed. 8 This principle of integration is as
153. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
Complaint by the European Communities and their Member States, at 51, WT/DS 1 14/R
(March 17, 2000).
154. Id.at 51-52.
155. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 604 (6th ed. 2003).
156. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, at 17
n.49, WT/DS 160/R (June 15, 2000).
157. GERVAIS, supra note 101, at 80.
The preamble to the TRIPS Agreement is an essential part of it. Under "GATT
law", preambles are on occasion relied upon to a considerable extent by panels
when the wording of a provision is not clear or where it is susceptible to divergent
interpretations.... The preamble, together with footnotes, should be considered as
an integral part of the agreement, a condensed expression of its underlying
principles.
Id.
158.
BROWNLIE, supra note 155, at 604.
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important as the principle of prioritizing text, so heavily relied upon by the
Canada-PatentProtection of PharmaceuticalProductspanel. It would be
proper, therefore, to classify the panel decision as an incomplete ground
upon which to build a robust TRIPS reading.
This integration principle can be detected in some other WTO
decisions. In construing the WTO Marrakesh Agreement, the Appellate
Body report in Brazil-Desiccated Coconut invoked the preamble to the
Agreement in the context of the integrated WTO system that replaced the
old GATT in 1947.'
Dispute settlement panels have made the same
inclusive interpretive gesture in other circumstances (leaving aside the cases
concerning environmental issues)."6
The integration principle provides for a supra-textual reading of the
treaties, which is not extraneous to WTO case law. 6 ' It considers both the
treaty as a whole, including its teleological markings (like preambles), 62
159. Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, at 18,
WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb. 21, 1997). The authors of the new WTO regime intended to put an
end to the fragmentation that had characterized the previous system. This can be seen from
the preamble to the WTO Agreement which states, in pertinent part:
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral
trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Id.
160. Panel Report, India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and IndustrialProducts, 7.2, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999) ("At the outset, we recall
that the Preamble to the WTO Agreement recognises both (i) the desirability of expanding
international trade in goods and services and (ii) the need for positive efforts designed to
ensure that developing countries secure a share in international trade commensurate with the
needs of their economic development. In implementing these goals, WTO rules promote
trade liberalization, but recognize the need for specific exceptions from the general rules to
address special concerns, including those of developing countries."); see also Panel Report,
Brazil- Export FinancingProgrammeFor Aircraft - Recourse By Canada To Article 21.5
of the DSU, 6.47 n.49, WT/DS46/RW (May 9, 2000) ("The preamble to the WTO
Agreement recognises [sic] 'that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the
growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development."').
161. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, at 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline] ("[T]he
General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.").. A
critical analysis of the interpretative usages of the adjudicatory bodies of OMC can be found
in Evandro Menezes de Carvalho, The JuridicalDiscourseof the World Trade Organization:
The Method of Interpretationof the Appellate Body's Reports, 7 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS, Iss.
1, Art. 4 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.comlcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1211 &content gj.
162. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000); see also Appellate Body report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) ("A
treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be
interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object
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and even other treaties.'63 Like the overall WTO Agreement itself, TRIPS
should not be read in "clinical isolation" from public international law."
B. Constructing Legal Principles out of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS
One barrier to incorporating balance as a concept within TRIPS is that
the WTO dispute settlement bodies so far have not fully captured the
valence of articles 7 and 8.165 Thus, we recommend the application of two
interpretive principles to their jurisprudence: (1) an "evolutive
and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning
imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the
correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the
treaty as a whole may usually be sought."). In Panel Report, United States-Sections 301310 of the tradeAct of 1974, 7.22, WT/DS 152/R (Dec. 22, 1999), the Panel concluded that
the elements of Article 31 of the VCLT, "are to be viewed as one holistic rule of
interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order."
The same was stated in Panel Report, European Communities-MeasuresAffecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-ContainingProducts, 8.46, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), providing that "to
the extent that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention contains a single rule of interpretation
and not a number of alternative rules, the various criteria in the Article should be considered
as forming part of a whole."
163. Under the standards of ICJ of what should be the context (the framework of the
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation), even some particular
instances of soft law would be relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties. This is not a secondary instance of interpretation (as perhaps the rulings
in the Shrimp-Turtles and Canada Pharmaceuticals cases might be felt to indicate) but
should be consulted together with the context where a primary reading is to be affected.
164. See generally Gabrielle Marceau, A Callfor Coherence in International Law:
Praisesfor the Prohibition against "Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J.
WORLD TRADE 87-152 (1999) (arguing in favor of incorporating non-WTO law in WTO
DSU decisions). The integration of TRIPS in the overall WTO structure also raises an
extremely important issue: the balancing of interests that, as shall be seen below, is a crucial
aspect of TRIPS application and enforcement, and is a complex operation where trade
interests and specific intellectual property-related interests shall be considered in some
specific cases. However, to the proportion that access to technology, expressive creations
and commercial image instruments are essential to a certain notion of development, a
complete nullification of societal values related to intellectual property rights and obligations
would seem contrary to the core TRIPS law, particularly as interpreted by the Member states
in the Doha Round exercises.
165. As Ruth Okediji stated, "[a] particularly revealing aspect of these [relevant
TRIPS] disputes is the way each of the Panels and the Appellate Body have ducked the
thorny question of how to apply the preambular statements and the broad themes of Article 7
and 8 to evaluate the substantive obligations of the TRIPS Agreement." Ruth L. Okediji,
Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 819, 914 (2003); see also Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 220-21
(noting the need for more elaboration of articles 7 and 8 to preserve balance and a robust
international public domain); Chon, supra note 6, at 2843 ("A key impediment, however, is
that the language referencing development in TRIPS [Article 8] is not mandatory, but rather
hortatory and that the language is placed within parts of the treaty that are not in the main
treaty body. This issue (rather than the substantive content of development) has preoccupied
the few legal scholars who have addressed these terms.").
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interpretative" approach that considers the changing context for
interpretation of relevant treaty provisions; and (2) a "vectorial" approach
that acknowledges and weighs competing principles that animate the
agreements.
1. From Rules to Principles: The Principleof Evolutive Interpretation
International law jurists have articulated a principle of evolutive
interpretation"6 consistent with the interpretative practice of the ICJ.'67 As
stated earlier, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides a
basis for considering subsequent agreements and practices of the parties in
treaty interpretation.'68 In the case of TRIPS, the combination of articles 7
and 8, and 71.1 of TRIPS, provided the basis for the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health as well as the General Council Decision
implementing Paragraph Six of that declaration.'69 This so-called Paragraph
Six solution subsequently evolved into a non-soft law norm-proposed
article 3 Ibis.1 70
Under the evolutive interpretation principle, these
"subsequent developments" arguably supersede the Canada Patent
Protection of PharmaceuticalProducts panel's limited interpretation of
articles 7 and 8.
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and General
Council Decision are obvious applications of the balancing approach
anticipated by articles 7 and 8 and the preambulary text. These balancing
exercises were undertaken by the very source holding the jus tractuum (the
treaty power)-that is, the member states themselves-in a manner
provided by the WTO and TRIPS rules. Thus, it is an authentic
interpretation by authoritative law-making bodies clearly integrating
development within intellectual property norm-interpretation. Furthermore,
166. MARISTELA BASSO, 0 DIREITO INTERNACIONAL DA PROPRIEDADE INTELECTUAL
76 (Livraria Do Advogado ed., 2000). See also Gabrielle Marceau, The WTO Dispute
Settlement and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS
AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 181, 200 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2006).
167. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13) (ParraAranguren, J., dissenting). As a general rule of interpretation, Article 31, paragraph 3(b), of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that account shall be taken,
together with the context, of "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." Vienna Convention,
supra note 118, art. 31 (b).
168. Vienna Convention, supra note 118, arts. 31(3)(a)-(b).
169. Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 120, 1 6; see also
4 (affirming "WTO
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 120,
members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all") (emphasis added); General Council Decision, supra note 122.
170. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Implementation of Paragraph11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the
Implementation of Paragraph6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005).
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these agreements directly indicate that some of the exceptions provided by
the TRIPS text (especially article 31) are to be employed as tools to enforce
the development and public interest values indicated by article 8. Finally,
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and General Council
Decision regarding intellectual property dispel the starkly one-sided
interpretation of TRIPS in Canada Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, according to which TRIPS was only intended to enhance
protection to the intellectual property rights holder.
An evolutive interpretation principle is further guided by the Doha
Declaration, which states that work in the TRIPS Council on these reviews
or on any other implementation issue should also look at the relationship
between the TRIPS Agreement and the UN Convention on Biodiversity; the
protection of traditional knowledge and folklore; and other relevant new
developments that member governments raise in the review of the TRIPS
Agreement. 171 It adds that the TRIPS Agreement's objectives (article 7) and
principles (article 8) should guide the TRIPS Council's work on these
topics, and must take development fully into account. 72 Finally, the new
WIPO Development Agenda links the language of article 7 to development
norms within the WIPO's intellectual property mandate. While not an
agreement of the WTO member states regarding the interpretation of
TRIPS, this language is nonetheless relevant as a type of "practice" of
certain member states (overlapping among the WTO and the WIPO)
because of the close relationship of the WTO to the WIPO within the
IIPRC. It reinforces the primacy of balancing intellectual property rights
with pro-development and public interest flexibilities.
2. From Rules to Principles:The Principleof Vectorial Interpretation
a. Defining the Vectorial Approach
The preamble, as well as articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, are to be
understood as norms of different function and character than the strictly
prescriptive provisions of the same text (for instance, the rule of a minimum
term for patents). The former are in the nature of principles whereas the
latter are built as rules.'73 Principles serve a different function than do rules.
171.
.172.

Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 120,1 19.
Id.

Luis ROBERTO BARROSO, INTERPRETA(CAO E APLICAA.kO DA CONSTITUICAO,
173.
FUNDAMENTOS DE UMA DOGMATICA CONSTITUCIONAL TRANSFORMADORA 232 (Editora

Saraiva 5th ed., 2003). As Barroso, the most celebrated Brazilian constitutional law author,
explains:
The qualitative distinction between rule and principle is one of the pillars of the
modem Constitutional Law, indispensable for overcoming the legal positivism
where the concept of Law was restricted to rules. The Constitution turns into an
open system, comprising rules and principles, permeable to legal values beyond the
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They lead away from
a positivist approach towards a normative approach of
17 4
treaty interpretation.
Within a treaty, principles can either be inferred (as in the
antidumping case mentioned above) or explicitly read from the
preambulatory and principle-specific clauses. This is especially the case
with respect to TRIPS article 8 (labeled "Principles," so as to dispel any
doubts as to its nature). But article 7, joined by some crucial preambulatory
text,175 also has a purpose. Moncayo von Hase has emphasized the active
interpretation resulting from a purpose-centered--or teleologicalapproach.176
positivism, where the ideas of justice and of accomplishment of the basic rights
play a central role. The change of paradigm in this matter must render special
tribute to the systematization of Ronald Dworkin. Its elaboration concerning the
different roles played by rules and principles gained universal course and now is
the conventional knowledge in the field. Rules are normative proposals formulated
under form of all or nothing .... Principles contain, normally, a higher valorative
load, an ethical bedding, a relevant policy decision, and indicate a certain direction
to follow. It occurs that it may exist, in a pluralist sequence, other principles that
shelter diverse decisions, values or fundaments, even opposed among themselves.
The collision of principles, therefore, is not only possible, as it is part of the logic
of the system, which has a dialectic nature. Therefore its incidence cannot be
treated in terms of all or nothing, of validity or invalidity. A dimension of weight
or importance must be recognized to the principles. Considering the elements of
the concrete case, the interpreter will have to make biased choices, when coping
with inevitable antagonisms, as the ones that exist between the freedom of speech
and the right of privacy, the free initiative and the state intervention, the right of
property and its social function. The application of the principles is effected
predominantly by means of balancing.
Id. (citations omitted) (translated by Denis Borges Barbosa). For a comprehensive analysis
of the application of the opposition between principle and rules in the context of International
and Comparative Law, see Jacob Dolinger, Evolution of Principlesfor Resolving Conflicts in
the Field of Contracts and Torts, in 283 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (2000).
174. ROBERT ALEXY,TEORiA DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 81(1997).
175. The first recital indicates two potentially opposing interests to be balanced:
Intellectual Property vs. Trade ("Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade,"
TRIPS, supra note 4, pmbl.). The third and fourth recitals draw an opposition between
private interests to be given due regard ("Recognizing that intellectual property rights are
private rights," TRIPS, supra note 4, pmbl.) and public interests to be similarly endorsed
("Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection
of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives," TRIPS,
supra note 4, pmbl.). The fifth recital is a clear and strong expression of a substantive
equality mandate towards the least developed countries.
176. Andrrs Moncayo von Hase, La protecci6n de las invenciones en America Latin
durante los ahos 2001-2002, INCIDENCIA DEL ADPIC EN LAS LEGISLACIONES
LATINOAMERICANAS,

available at http://www.ml.ua.es/webprom/Jornadas/documentos/Mon-

cayo-Invenciones.pdf [hereinafter Moncayo von Hase, La Proteccion].
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Another important aspect of a principle-based approach is that
principles are not applied in the abstract, but rather to the facts in a specific
case, upon the chosen value-grounds. 17 7 Such an approach has in fact
occurred in some cases, where the equities of a particular case and the
consequences of choosing one outcome over another were part of the
process of adjudication. By contrast, the adjudicating body in CanadaPatent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products decided to ignore such
interpretative mechanisms, as though they were irrelevant to the specific
case under its review.1 7 Thus, the panel decided to focus on just one of the
interests to be balanced: the purpose of TRIPS as to intellectual property
rights was held to be to "reinforce the protection of these rights."
is an example of an unbalanced, hypertextual,
Therefore, this decision
79
ultrapositivist ruling.1

Sus articulos 7 y 8 ponen de relieve los objetivos y principios bisicos que inspiran
al Acuerdo y que han de guiar su interpretaci6n. En ellos se pone dnfasis en la
necesidad de lograr un equilibrio entre la protecci6n de los derechos de propiedad
intelectual y la necesidad de difundir y transferir tecnologia y la posibilidad de
adopci6n por parte de los Estados parte de medidas destinadas a proteger el medio
ambiente y la salud pfiblica y prevenir el abuso de los derechos de propiedad
intelectual por sus titulares.
Id. at 2. For a more specific analysis of such reading by the same author, as applied to the
see
www.eclac.cl/mexico/capacidadescomercpharmaceuticals
decision,
Canada
iales/CD%20Seminario%2011%20nov%2005/DOCUTMENTOS/AMoncayo%20OMPICEPAL.pdf [hereinafter Moncayo von Hase, Canada Pharmaceuticals]; von Hase, supra note
110, at 137.
177. James Gathii, Fairnessas Fidelity to Making the WTO Fully Responsive to All
its Members, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 97TH

ANNUAL MEETING 163 (2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=594485&high=%20james%20Gathii ("WTO Appellate Body (AB) in the initial
Shrimp-Turtle case (Shrimp-Turtle 1) held, in interpreting the meaning of Article 3.1 of the
SPS Agreement, that where there is a choice in construing a treaty provision, the principle of
in dubio mitius-'the less onerous meaning to the party which assumes the obligation, or
which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less
general restrictions upon the parties'-is to be preferred. The AB therefore concluded: 'We
cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon themselves the more
onerous, rather than the less burdensome obligation."' (footnotes omitted)).
178. More precisely, the panel decided to focus on just one of the interests to be
balanced: the purpose of TRIPS as to intellectual property rights was held to "reinforce the
protection of these rights." Panel Report, Canada-PatentProtection of Pharmaceutical
Products, Complaint by the European Communities and their Member States, at 52,
WT/DSl 14/R (March 17, 2000).
179. Robert Howse, supra note 145, at 502. By denying the balancing norm of
Articles Seven and Eight just to enhance the interests of the rights holders, the panel was
excluding the effect of a provision of the text. Gasoline, supra note 161, at 17 ("One of the
corollaries of the 'general rule of interpretation' in the Vienna Convention is that
interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not
free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty
to redundancy or inutility.").
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By contrast, we propose a vectorial approach. This approach would
incorporate the purposes of TRIPS, as expressed in its preambular language
and articles 7 and 8. It would also pay more heed to the principle of
integration, as described in Section II.A, as well as to foundational treaty
principles where conflicting values may be at issue in the particular facts of
a dispute. Thus, the objectives and principles of TRIPS should play a
central role in the interpretation of the entire agreement.
b. Towards a Vectorial Reading of TRIPS
The TRIPS principles command a vectorial reading. The norms
expressed in the preamble and articles 7 and 8 indicate opposing interests
that should be given due respect and reconciliation. A vectorial reading
supposes that different interests receive their due. The resulting finding of
law never excludes any of the interests at stake but, much to the contrary,
shall strive to give to each its proper legal consideration according to the
classical rule of sui cuique tribuere. Vectorial analysis is not satisfied by a
starkly unilateral interpretation of TRIPS, or even by the overall WTO
context: As the much quoted Gasoline
case states, the General Agreement
180
cannot be read in clinical isolation.
An effective vectorial approach assumes that all competing interests
are to be given some degree of subjective fungibility. That is, any party
may be held to the same rigors of the law (putting every party in Rawls's
"original position,")"8 ' extended to the global community." 2 Whether a
vectorial approach in international trade law is safe or wise is a very serious
question. Developing and developed country interests are not fully
fiingible, at least in the short term,8 3 and the long-term view is not the
180.
181.

See Gasoline, supranote 161.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY

OF JUSTICE (1999).

182. Gathii, supra note 177, at 159.
Egalitarian liberals invoke a Rawlsian framework according to which benefits and
burdens in the trading regime ought to be distributed in accordance initially with an
equality principle that would treat all members of the WTO similarly and without
distinction. However, egalitarian liberals emphasize the importance of John
Rawls's difference principle, according to which, in the distribution of benefits and
burdens, concern for the most vulnerable members of the trading regime should be
taken into account. One thread that runs through this approach is that fairness is
regarded as a condition of moral equality and, for some of its advocates, a
precondition for economic justice.
Id. (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4, 14-15 (1971)).
183. When some portion of the parties is probably immune from that fungibility-as
TRIPS assumes that the least developed countries for the time being are-a rule of
substantive equality is a requirement of Justice, or (in a rather utilitarian perspective) of long
term efficiency. Chon notes:
As Carlos Correa has stated, 'When the [knowledge] products are essential for lifeas with food and pharmaceuticals-allocative efficiency becomes an important
objective on both economic and equity grounds.' In other words, equality tilts the
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province of adjudicatory bodies. These are real problems. But the fact is
that the WTO Agreements include vectorial norms, in addition to the rule of
pactasunt servanda.
Articles 7 and 8 are, beyond any doubt, interpretative tools with
respect to the meaning of the TRIPS agreement."8 Crucial for many
developing countries in the TRIPS negotiations was the perceived vectorial
role of articles 7 and 8. A stated target for developing countries during
TRIPS negotiations was to achieve a balancing of interests. 8 Written
submissions of a more general nature presenting views on these questions
were circulated by Thailand,186 Mexico, 18 and Brazil."'
The Brazilian position was relevant in this context. Brazil emphasized
the need to keep in mind both the trade-related and developmental aspects
of intellectual property rights. It distinguished the discussion in the
developing countries' working group from more legal discussions being
held by the developed countries, including:

balance towards static efficiency and away from dynamic efficiency arguments, at
least for resource-poor areas of the world. A failure to understand that will lead to
policy impasses.
Chon, supra note 6, at 2891.
184. Moncayo von Hase, La Proteccion,supra note 176.
185. See TRIPS Negotiating Document, MTN.GNG/NGI 1/W/32/Rev.1 (Sept. 29,
1989).
186. Statement by Thailand at the Meeting of 12-14 *September 1988,
MTN.GNG/NG11 /W/27 (Sept. 12, 1988).
The Thai statement ... emphasi[zed] that the two fundamental goals pursued by
governments when granting intellectual property protection are the stimulation or
encouragement of intellectual property creation and the accord of proper and
legitimate protection of the public interest; the former must not put an undue
burden on or adversely affect the latter.
TRIPS Negotiating Document, 5, MTN.GNG/NG 11/W/32/Rev. I (Sept. 29, 1989).
187. GATT Secretariat, Statement Made by the Delegation of Mexico at the Meeting
of 17, 18 and 21 October 1988, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/28 (Oct. 19, 1988).
The statement by Mexico . . . [stated] that the negotiating objective regarding the
improvement of intellectual property rights should not become a barrier to access
by developing countries to technologies produced in developed countries. Any
results obtained in the Group would therefore necessarily have to include more
flexible elements for the use of such technology by developing countries, since
countries with different levels of development cannot respond in the same way to
each of the trade and intellectual property aspects. Mexico also advocates
examination of Articles IX, XX and XXIII of the General Agreement and says that
the provisions of the General Agreement should not be used to modify legal
regimes governing intellectual property rights, but should aim, in the best of cases,
at recommendations to reduce distortions in international trade and barriers to that
trade which may derive from the application and protection of intellectual property
rights.
GATT Secretariat, Synoptic Tables Setting Out Existing International Standard and
ProposedStandards andPrinciples, 5, MTN.GNG/NG1 1/W/32/Rev. 1 (Sept. 29, 1989).
188. Submission from Brazil, MTN.GNG/NG1l/W/30 (Oct. 30, 1988).
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i) The extent to which rigid and excessive protection of intellectual property rights
impedes access to the latest technological developments, restricting therefore the
participation of developing countries in international trade. In this context, it
emphasizes the importance of specific exclusions from the protection of
intellectual property rights.
ii) The extent to which abusive use of intellectual property rights gives rise to
restrictions and distortions in international trade. Practices which have this effect
should be subject to adequate multilateral discipline.
iii) The risks that a rigid system of protection of intellectual property rights implies
for international trade. Attentive consideration should be given to cases where the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights become a barrier or
harassment to legitimate trade, including where it189 is used as an excuse to
implement protectionist and discriminatory measures.

The language of article 7 does not limit itself to exclusive rights, as the
final clause indicates: "The protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights should contribute

.

.

.

to a balance of rights and

obligations. '190

The idea of balancing is obviously a vectorial device.
Balancing, as is developed in the legal discourse in many countries, appears
explicitly in TRIPS article 7. It prevents the protection of the interests of
the intellectual property rights holders to the exclusion of other "rights and
obligations."
Article 8 of TRIPS foresees that each country can legislate, within the
scope of TRIPS, "to protect the public health and nutrition and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance [for its] socioeconomic and
technological development." 9 ' The retention of state sovereignty or
traditional "police powers" in these areas relative to other measures in the
TRIPS Agreement, combined with the procedural rule that the alleging
party has the burden of proof, point to an implicit article 8 default
procedural presumption in a vectorial analysis.
Article 8 also has substantive as well as procedural dimensions.
"[P]ublic health and . . . interest in sectors of vital importance" 92 are
obviously interest categories of high value in any legal system. Once the
content of such measures are not prima facie a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
189. TRIPS negotiating document,
5, MTN.GNG/NGll/W/32/Rev.1 (Sept. 29,
1989).
190. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 7 (emphasis added).
191. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 8.1 ("Members may, in formulating or amending their
laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement."). Incidentally, the provision is, by allowing the national law topromote the
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, almost a littera ad litteram reproduction of the wording of art. 5. XXIX of the
Brazilian Constitution of 1988.
192. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 8.1.
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prevail, or are not a disguised restriction on international trade, a vectorial
interpretative approach should give great weight to the built-in flexibilities
of TRIPS to address domestic development concerns.1 93
c. Re-Interpreting Caselaw Through the Vectorial Approach
In the first few years after the adoption of TRIPS, the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) considered two complaints regarding domestic
standards of patent protection alleged to have violated international trade
law obligations. Despite the explicit language of articles 7 and 8, as well as
the negotiating history of those articles, both decisions proceed from the
assumption that TRIPS is primarily concerned with protecting intellectual
property, even though TRIPS plainly indicates a vectorial approach.
In India Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
ChemicalProducts, the WTO Appellate Body considered whether India had
complied with its obligations under TRIPS with respect to its mailbox
process for filing patent applications for pharmaceutical, agricultural, and
chemical products. India's obligations to provide minimum standards of
patent protection would become effective only ten years after the adoption
of TRIPS (i.e., in 2005). India unsuccessfully defended the original
complaint lodged by the United States (and largely supported by the
European Union) before a DSB panel. It was largely unsuccessful in its
attempt to overturn the panel decision on appeal. The Appellate Body
decision tempered some of the more disagreeable aspects of the panel's
193. The conclusion of article 8 is an important consideration: "[P]rovided that they
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." Id. art. 8.2. A similar provision can be
found at the 1947 GATT art. XX (b). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX(b),
Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. GATT 1947 allows for such measures as
non-violative, provided that they "are not applied in a manner [that] constitute[s] a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." Id. Article 8.1 simply "provides
that necessary measures must be 'consistent with' the Agreement." UNCTAD-ICTSD,
RESOURCE BOOK ON

TRIPS

AND DEVELOPMENT

126 (2005). As the UNCTAD Resource

book notes:
Since language of a treaty is presumed not to be surplus, it would appear that
Article 8.1 is to be read as a statement of TRIPS interpretative principle: it advises
that Members were expected to have the discretion to adopt internal measures they
consider necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development. The constraint is that the measures they adopt should not violate the
terms of the agreement. This suggests that measures adopted by Members to
address public health, nutrition and matters of vital socio-economic importance
should be presumed to be consistent with TRIPS, and that any Member seeking to
challenge the exercise of discretion should bear the burden of proving
inconsistency.
Discretion to adopt measures is built into the agreement.
Challengers should bear the burden of establishing that discretion has been abused.
Id. at 126-27.
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findings, but its reasoning viewed the main object and purpose of TRIPS as
the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights. In the Appellate Body's view, TRIPS is simply about the
protection of intellectual property. 4
As discussed above, balance suffered a similar fate in Canada Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, where the panel adopted the
European Communities' argument that three conditions of TRIPS article 30
should not be construed against the objectives and purposes stated in TRIPS
articles 7 and 8. In doing so, the panel rejected Canada's position that
"these purposes call for a liberal interpretation of the three conditions ... so
that governments would have the necessary flexibility to adjust patent rights
to maintain the desired balance with other important national policies." '95
The panel ultimately stated that doing 1' so
would constitute "a renegotiation
96
of the basic balance of the Agreement.'
By contrast, under a vectorial interpretation, the application of each
provision of TRIPS by the member states would be analyzed by reference to
the principles identified in the preamble and articles 7 and 8. Rather than
assuming that the balance has already been struck with respect to each
separate part of the treaty, an adjudicative body would recalibrate the
balance of principles with respect to each treaty provision as applied to the
specific legal issue in dispute.
Moreover, any particular dispute would be considered under the
principle of evolutive interpretation, discussed earlier in Subsection II.B. 1.
That is, interpretation of treaty text should be considered in light of
subsequent agreements and practices regarding its interpretation. As
discussed, the overall interpretative context for development provisions
within TRIPS has changed dramatically with the advent of the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and its subsequent developments.
We now turn to our second proposal. Unlike the first, we apply it
primarily to the activities of the WIPO as the second integral strand of the
IIPRC, which are explicitly linked to human development.

194. Report of the Panel, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/6 (Oct. 16, 1997); Appellate Body Report,
India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
195. Report of the Panel, Canada-PatentProtection of PharmaceuticalProducts,
Complaint by the European Communities and their member States, 7.24, WT/DS 114/R
(March 17, 2000).
196. Id. 7.26.
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III. A SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE WITHIN THE IIPRC
A. Defining Substantive Equality
As recently observed,
[p]olicy choices of international social redistribution and economic intervention,
can rest only with difficulty on a legal mechanism of formal non-discrimination;
quite the contrary, they necessitate degrees of "positive discrimination" or
"affirmative action", not only between the rich and the poor, the developed and the
1 97
developing, but between different sorts and categories of developing economies.
Formal equality within the IIPRC is shaped at the level of applicable
legal principles, as well as practices within dispute resolution mechanisms.
MFN, a bedrock principle of the multilateral trading system of GATT, was
recently imported into IIPRC through TRIPS article 498 Combined with

the principle of, national treatment,199 already a long-standing provision of

the Berne and Paris Conventions,2" the TRIPS Agreement embodies two
powerful principles of non-discrimination. MFN is a principle of nondiscrimination among foreign nationals; national treatment is a principle of
non-discrimination barring internal discrimination in favor of domestic
actors over non-nationals. The "floor" of acceptable conduct is set
"voluntarily" by each member state: in the case of MFN, by "any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the
nationals of any other country;""2 1 in the case of national treatment, by any
"treatment ... accord[ed]"2' 2 to the Member's own nationals. These two
non-discrimination principles within TRIPS are entrenched within
GATT/WTO generally, although MFN was quite often recognized in the
breach.2"3 This may continue to be the case under TRIPS.2" These nondiscrimination principles have historically impeded efforts to infuse trade
197. Broude, supra note 3, at 35-36.
198. TRIPS, supra note 4, art 4; supra note 187.
199. TRIPS, supra note 4, art 3.
200. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 2, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 (Mar. 20, 1883); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.
5, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Sept. 9, 1886).
201.
TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 4.
202. Id. art. 3(1).
203. Broude, supra note 3, at 11-12.
The non-discriminatory nature of the GATT/WTO should therefore be taken as a
relative matter rather than an absolute one. The question has (of course) never
been whether non-discrimination should be abolished as a guiding or organizing
principle, but rather,, under which circumstances should discrimination be
condemned and under which should it be absolved. In the main, this has been
regarded as a question of trade economics: in blunt lay terms, when does
discrimination create more trade than it diverts?
Id. at 12.
204. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
193, at 79-81.
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with nuanced development efforts because the principles are relatively
hostile to differentiation among states, including by development status.
They are the two pillars of "formal equality" within international
intellectual property."0 5
A third aspect of formal equality expresses itself through the minimum
standards of TRIPS, which are imposed on all member states regardless of
their actual levels of development. For example, TRIPS modified the global
minimum patent standards substantially with its rule that "patent rights [be]
enjoyable without discrimination as to place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.""2 6 This
patent-specific non-discrimination principle revised the domestic policy
space for all member states, which previously had been allowed, for
example, to withhold the granting of patents for pharmaceutical products or
to encourage patent holders to work the patent locally." 7 Article 27(1), in
the guise of non-discrimination, raised the global minimum standards of
protection in the patent domain to a higher level than had existed
previously. This represents a type of "aggregation" or technology-neutrality
that is increasingly criticized as a matter of domestic policy.0
At the level of dispute resolution, the WTO relies on highly
formalistic decision-making processes, which has caused two leading
international intellectual property observers to characterize the dispute
settlement system as one of formal equality in the context of industrialized
countries' innovation policies. 9 This observation of formalism in norminterpretation, a fourth pillar of formal equality, has parallels in the general
trade literature, where the DSB has been criticized for the same reasons." '
Moreover, a relatively small percentage of the complaints filed with the
WTO have been filed by developing countries, and developed countries like
the United States have refused to implement WTO rulings adverse to their
domestic interests. These facts suggest that, "after a decade of operation the

205. Id. at 89.
206. TRIPS, supra note 4, art 27.1. The least-developed countries have been given
until January 1, 2016 to meet this obligation with respect to pharmaceutical products. Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 120, 1 7.
207.

UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note

193, at 368-72.
208. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1626 (2003).
209. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 139, at 96.
210. Broude, supra note 3, at 16.
The other side of this coin, a growth defect in its own right, is the formalistic and
legalized nature of the WTO's dispute settlement system. Lashed to an almost
static political norm-making system, the judicial branch of the WTO is extremely
careful not to stray from the boundaries of political consensus, for fear of
damaging its own legitimacy, when faced with sensitive issues.
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WTO remains a rich man's club beyond the reach of most developing
nations."21
Like the WTO, the WIPO is also permeated with formal equality.
This is most evident in the WIPO's norm-setting activities. As an
intergovernmental organization, the WIPO treats its member states formally
as equal players: It is a shibboleth that the WIPO is or should be a memberdriven organization. Yet, as discussed in Part I, structural asymmetry
prevents various member states from engaging in fully informed decisionmaking at both national and international levels.1 2 Recognition of and
dissatisfaction with formal equality at the WIPO gave rise to the original
' 213
proposal called the "Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO.
Since the WIPO General Assembly considered the initial proposal in
the fall of 2004, various member states made further formal submissions in
seven subsequent meetings.214 These documents elaborated upon difficulties
with the WIPO's treatment of member states as formally equal, and
suggested both substantive and procedural reforms to inject pro-

211.
Drache, supranote 47, at 6.
212. See text accompanying notes 94-100.
213. Proposalby Argentina and Brazil, supra note 73.
214. These submissions include proposals submitted to the Intersessional
Intergovernmental Meeting (IIM) First Session Apr. 11-13, 2005 by the so-called "Friends of
Development." See WIPO, Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An
Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document Wo/GA/31/11, IM/Il/4 (Apr. 6, 2005); WIPO,
Proposalby the United States of Americafor the Establishmentof a PartnershipProgram in
WIPO, IIMI1/2 (Mar. 18, 2005); WIPO, Proposal by Mexico on Intellectual Property and
Development, IIM/1/3 (Apr. 1, 2005); WIPO, Proposal by the United Kingdom, IIM/1/5
(Apr. 7, 2005). Submissions also include proposals submitted to the IIM Second Session
June 20-22, 2005. See WIPO, Proposal by the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Importance of
Intellectual Property in Social and Economic Development and National Development
Programs,IIM/2/2 (June 14, 2005); WIPO, Proposal by the UnitedKingdom, IIM/2/3 (June
14, 2005). Submissions also include a proposal submitted to the IIM Third Session. See
WIPO, Proposalby Morocco on Behalfof the African Group Entitled "The African Proposal
for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO", IIM/3/2 (July 18, 2005).
Submissions also include proposals submitted to the Provisional Committee on the
Development Agenda (PCDA) First Session. See WIPO, Proposalby Chile, PCDA/I/2 (Jan.
12, 2006); WIPO, Proposal by Columbia, PCDA/I/3 (Feb. 14, 2006); WIPO, Proposal by
the United States of America to Establish a PartnershipProgram in WIPO: An Elaboration
of Issues Raised in Document IIMI/12, PCDA/1/4 (Feb. 17, 2006); WIPO, Proposalfor the
Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO: A Frameworkfor Achieving Concrete
and Practical Results in the Near and Longer Terms, PCDA/1/5 (Feb. 17, 2006).
Submissions also include proposals submitted to the PCDA Second Session. See WIPO,
Proposal on the Decision of the PCDA on the Establishment of a WIPO Development
Agenda, PCDA/2/2 (June 23, 2006); WIPO, Proposal on Recommendation to the General
Assembly of WIPO, PCDA/2/3 (June 30, 2006). In addition, an official document was
prepared by Ambassador Enrique A. Manalo, Chair of the General Assembly, for the Third
Session of the PCDA held in February 2007. See WIPO, Working Document for the
Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda (PCDA),
PCDA/3/2 (Feb. 20, 2007).
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development concerns into the WIPO's mandate.2" 5 A clash of perspectives,
if not civilizations, has been evident over the meaning of the term
"development." For example, the United States has equated development to
growth, emphasizing the benefits of intellectual property and the dangers of
piracy.2 16 On the other hand, a Chilean proposal urged the WIPO to study:
[T]he costs [of intellectual property systems] and, in turn, the most ... appropriate
levels of protection of intellectual property rights, taking into account the degree of
development and particular social and cultural situation in a country, based on the
minimum standard[s] established
2 17 by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS).

Gathering these multiple perspectives under one big tent at the
conclusion of the February 2006 meeting of the Provisional Committee for
the Development Agenda (PCDA), the WIPO Secretariat organized the over
one hundred separate proposals into six clusters."' These include:
(A) Technical Assistance and Capacity Building;
(B) Norm-setting, Flexibilities, Public Policy and Public Domain;
(C) Technology Transfer, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and
Access to Knowledge;
(D) Assessments, Evaluation and Impact Studies;
(E) Institutional Matters Including Mandate and Governance; and
(F) Other Issues.

The General Assembly, at its September 2007 meeting, adopted the fortyfive recommendations that the WIPO member states agreed upon and
forwarded for consideration.
To counter the formal equality that pervades the IIPRC, Professor
Chon has previously proposed a "substantive equality" principle. This
proposal is based upon a development as freedom-oriented approach to
intellectual property norm-setting and norm-interpretation. Under this
approach, the lawmaker would exercise more skepticism towards the
validity of a regulation where it conflicts with a development-sensitive
human need, as defined in part by the Millennium Development Goals. A
regulation in this context is defined as a grant of an exclusive right over a
knowledge good or, conversely, the withholding or narrowing of an
exception or limitation to that exclusive right. This substantive equality

215. WIPO, Proposalto Establisha Development Agendafor WIPO: An Elaboration
of Issues Raised in Document WO/GA/31/11,
42, 40-52, IIM/1/4 (Apr. 6, 2005).
216. WIPO, Proposal by the United States of America to Establish a Partnership
Program in WIPO: An Elaborationof Issues Raised in Document 1IM/1/2, PCDA/1/4 (Feb.
17, 2006).
217. WIPO, Proposalby Chile, at 4, PCDA/1/2 (Jan. 12, 2006).
218. WIPO, PCDA, Report, at Annex I, PCDA/1/6 (July 3, 2006).
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principle would be applied both domestically and in international decisionmaking venues.21 9
A substantive equality principle should shift the balance between
static and dynamic efficiencies, so that short-term access and affordability
may take priority over long-term innovation policy goals where
necessary. 22° The principle will allow lawmakers to achieve a different
balance of minimum standards with flexibilities, and possibly even to
distinguish among different technologies, despite the mandate of nondiscrimination in article 27(1).221 It may allow lawmakers to distinguish
among different industries, countries, and levels of development, if
necessary.
This substantive equality principle can be employed both at the
international level and at the national level; both in public law and in private
ordering. It can be multiple and decentralized, in order to address the
multiple sites of international intellectual property norm-setting and norminterpretation. Here, we turn to a different aspect of the regime complex
than was analyzed in Part II, namely, the WIPO. We speculate on how the
substantive equality principle might impact the norm-setting mandates
approved as part of the WIPO Development Agenda.
B. Applying Substantive Equality to Intellectual Property Norm-Setting:
The WIPO Development Agenda
Some development agencies and developing countries approach
intellectual property from a development as freedom model. 22 Moreover,
219. Chon, supranote 6, at 2885; see also Chon, IntellectualProperty 'from Below",
supra note 140; Chon, supra note 8.
220. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308 (Inge Kaul et al. eds.,
1999). "The gain in dynamic efficiency from the greater innovative activity [from
intellectual property protection] is intended to balance out the losses from static inefficiency
from the underutilization of the knowledge or from the underproduction of the good
protected by the patent." Id. at 311 (emphasis in original). Argentinean economist Carlos
M. Correa states that "[tihe static-dynamic efficiency rationale applicable to an industrial
country does not necessarily hold where inequality is high. Strong protection for intellectual
property rights may have significant negative allocative consequences in developing
countries without contributing to-and even impeding-their technological development."
Carlos M. Correa, Managing the Provision of Knowledge: The Design of Intellectual
Property Laws, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 414 (Inge
Kaul et al. eds., 2003).
221.
Chamas CI, SM Paulino de Carvalho & S Salles-Filho, Current Issues of IP
Management in Health and Agriculture in Brazil 12, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST
PRACTICES (Anatole Krattiger, et al. eds., 2007).
222. Innovation, Essential Health Research and IPRs: The WHO Working Group,
INTELL.
PROP.
Q.
UPDATE,
Third Quarter 2006, at 1-7,
available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IP Update 3Q06.pdf (describing WHO's Working Group
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human rights norms are beginning to intersect with human development
norms within the IIPRC:
[T]he implementation of article 27 of the UDHR and article 15 of the ICESCR
[suggest that b]y striking the right balance in these articles, states may be able to
increase the resources that can be used to realize other human rights. After all, a
reduction of intellectual property protection that exceeds the core minimum
obligations under human rights instruments would provide more access for the
public to exercise their rights to cultural participation and development and to the
benefits of scientific progress. Such reduction may also further the protection of
the right to food (in terms of patented seeds, agrochemicals, and foodstuffs), the
right to health (in terms of patented pharmaceuticals), the right to education (in
terms of copyrighted textbooks and software), and the right to freedom of
expression (in terms of copyrighted works in general).223

These views are beginning to impact the view of how intellectual
property law should operate in a global policy-making space where the
production of multiple public goods must be encouraged. 224 Furthermore,
the IIPRC is encountering the development as freedom concerns adopted
widely in United Nations Millennium Development Goals (UNMDG) 25
Within intellectual property, these development as freedom
approaches must contend with the formal equality rules of intellectual
property, which have been forged largely within a model of development as
growth. Universal access to primary education, for example, is a goal set by
the United Nations as one of the UNMDG. Under the development as
freedom approach, education is arguably a core constituent component of
development, which builds capacity for innovation. Under a development
as growth model, education has no special claim on intellectual property but
is rather simply an instrumental aspect of human capital formation used to
further economic growth. The absence of a development as freedom
approach in the WIPO comes through sharply in the WIPO's discussion of
its development role vis-A-vis education. The lament is about the lack of
education about intellectual property rights rather than the lack of access to
basic education.226
that is to draw up a global strategy and plan of action for promoting medical research and
development (R&D) for diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries,
pursuant to WHA 59.24).
223. Yu, supra note 127; Helfer, supra note 127 (analyzing General Comment 17,
which interprets ICESCR Article 15(1)(c)); Dreyfliss, supra note 127; see also Alston, supra
note 14.
224. See GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 308 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999); see also PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 414 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003).
225. G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.html.
Philip Alston claims that these have
arguably attained the status of customary international law. Alston, supra note 14, at 771-74.
226. KAMIL IDRIS & HISAMITSU ARAI, WIPO, PUBL'N NO. 988(E), THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY-CONSCIOUS NATION: MAPPING THE PATH FROM DEVELOPING TO DEVELOPED 56-57
(2006).
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UN agencies other than the WIPO, such as the World Health
Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, or the UN High
Commission on Human Rights, are more sympathetic to the human
development approach and may view their mandates broadly as intersecting
with the intellectual property norm-setting mandates of the WIPO.227
Nonetheless, these other organizations are still ancillary to the intellectual
property norm-setting regime, which is currently dominated by the WTO
and the WIPO. Any fundamental change to the way these two organizations
approach intellectual property and development must come from within
these organizations themselves. A substantive equality principle would
operate within a norm-setting environment, such as the WIPO, to include
social welfare goals other than innovation.
The WIPO Development Agenda discussion has highlighted the
significance of the WIPO's inclusion as a member of the UN system.
Among other things, the original proposal called for the WIPO to
implement its functions in the context of various initiatives of the United
Nations, of which it is an agency. Because of its long and somewhat
complex history-initially as BIRPI, an administrative bureau for the Paris
and Berne Conventions in 1893; then as the WIPO, an international
intellectual property organization not affiliated with the UN; and in its
current incarnation since 1974 as a specialized agency of the UN 228-- the
WIPO perhaps has multiple and fractured identities. On the one hand, it is
an intellectual property maximalist organization, reflecting its origins as a
bureau for two treaties that were drafted by and for the rights holders of
developed countries. This history of promoting intellectual property worldwide on behalf of developed countries is reflected in its 1967 WIPO
Convention, which states that the organization's purpose is to "promote the
protection of intellectual property throughout the world .. .."I" On the
other hand, since 1974, the WIPO has another mandate as a UN agency.
The 1974 Agreement between the United Nations and the WIPO refers to
the latter as being:
[A] specialized agency [within the UN] and as being responsible for taking
appropriate action in accordance with its basic instrument, treaties and agreements
administered by it, inter alia, for promoting creative intellectual activity and for
facilitating the transfer of technology related to industrial property to the
in order to accelerate economic, social and cultural
developing countries
230
development.

227. Musungu, supra note 39; Helfer, supra note 55.
228. Musungu & Dutfield, supra note 56, at 4.
229. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 3,
848 U.N.T.S. 3 (July 14, 1967), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
convention/pdf/trtdocs_wo029.pdf (emphasis added).
230. Agreement Between the U.N. and the WIPO, art. 1, Dec. 17, 1974, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/index.html (emphasis added); see also James
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The initial WIPO Development Agenda proposal reiterated the
instrumental purpose of intellectual property and called for a contextualized
assessment of the impact of intellectual property on development. It alluded
several times to the WIPO's role as a UN agency.231 For example, the
proposal stated:
As a United Nations specialized agency, WIPO has an obligation to ensure that its
technical cooperation activities are geared towards implementing all relevant UN
development objectives, which are not limited to economic development alone.
These activities should also be fully consistent with the requirements of UN
operational activities232in this field - they must be, in particular, neutral, impartial
and demand-driven.

The WIPO Development Agenda debate points to potential constraints
upon the WIPO to reflect upon the WIPO's own changing identity and role
vis-As-vis development. This is in part due to its historical embeddedness as
a rights-holders organization, and to disagreement among member states
about what development means. It is also in part due to the WIPO's
unreflective alignment with a model of development as growth, apparent in
the kinds of member-state proposals that the WIPO chooses to prioritize in
its standing committees. For example, since 1998 and especially in its
recent sessions, the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights
(SCCR) has focused energy on the protection of broadcasting
organizations.233 This is viewed as a natural extension of the digital agenda,
which began in 1996 with the negotiations over the WIPO Copyright Treaty

and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.234 On the other hand,
a Chilean proposal to study international minimum exceptions and
limitations, which was proposed to the SCCR's twelfth session and
discussed at some length during its thirteen session,235 has languished.

Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of IntellectualProperty, 2004 DuKE L. & TECH.
REV. 9.
231. Proposalby Argentina andBrazil, supra note 73.
232. Id. at VII. This particular recommendation (with slightly different wording) is
one of the forty-five to be forwarded to the General Assembly in September 2007. PCDA
Final Recommendations, supra note 2 ("1. W1PO technical assistance shall be, inter alia,
development oriented, demand driven and transparent, taking into account the priorities and
the special needs of developing countries, especially LDCs, as well as the different levels of
development of Member States and activities should include time frames for completion. In
this regard, design, delivery mechanisms and evaluation processes of technical assistance
programs should be country specific.").
233. WIPO, SCCR, Revised Draft Basic Proposal for the WIPO Treaty on the
Protectionof BroadcastingOrganizations,SCCR/ 15/2 (July 31, 2006).
234. WIPO, Copyright Treaty, Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65; WIPO,
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
235. WIPO, SCCR, Proposal by Chile on the Analysis of Exceptions and Limitations,
SCCR/13/5 (Nov 22, 2005); WIPO, SCCR, Proposalby Chile on the Subject "Exceptions
and Limitations to Copyright and Related Rights", SCCR/12/3 (Nov. 2, 2004).
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Included in the forty-five recommendations proposed by the WIPO
member states and later adopted by the General Assembly, was the
establishment of a Committee on Development and IP. 236 With respect to
Cluster B, which bears most directly on the question of global intellectual
property balance and development, these recommendations are as follows:
15. Norm setting activities shall:
*
"
*
*

"

be inclusive and member driven;
take into account different levels of development;
take into consideration a balance between costs and benefits;
be a participatory process, which takes into consideration the interests
and priorities of all WIPO Member States and the viewpoints of other
stakeholders, including accredited intergovernmental organizations and
non governmental organizations; and
be in line with the principle of neutrality of the WIPO Secretariat.

16. Consider the preservation of the public domain within the WIPO's normative
processes and deepen the analysis of the implications and benefits of a rich and
accessible public domain.
17. In its activities, including norm setting, WIPO should take into account the
flexibilities in international IP agreements, especially those which are of interest to
developing countries and LDCs.
18. To urge the IGC to accelerate the process on the protection of genetic
resources, traditional knowledge and folklore, without prejudice to any outcome,
including the possible development of an international instrument or instruments.
19. To initiate discussions on how, within the WIPO's mandate, to further facilitate
access to knowledge and technology for developing countries and LDCs to foster
creativity and innovation and to strengthen such existing activities within W1PO.
20. To promote norm-setting activities related to IP that support a robust public
domain in WIPO's Member States, including the possibility of preparing
guidelines which could assist interested Member States in identifying subject
matters that have fallen into the public domain within their respective jurisdictions.
21. WIPO shall conduct informal, open and balanced consultations, as appropriate,
prior to any new norm setting activities, through a member-driven process,
promoting the participation of experts from Member States, particularly developing
countries and LDCs.
22. WIPO's norm setting activities should be supportive of the development goals
agreed within the UN system, including those contained in the Millennium
Declaration.
The WIPO Secretariat, without prejudice to the outcome of Member States
considerations, should address in its working documents for norm-setting
activities, as appropriate and as directed by Member States, issues such as: a)
safeguarding national implementation of intellectual property rules b) links
between IP and competition c) IP-related transfer of technology d) potential
flexibilities, exceptions and limitations for Member States and e) the possibility of
additional special provisions for developing countries and LDCs.

236.

PCDA FinalRecommendations, supra note 2.
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23. To consider how to better promote pro-competitive IP licensing practices,
particularly with a view to fostering creativity, innovation and the transfer and
to interested countries, in particular developing
dissemination of technology
237
countries and LDCs.

The numerous references in Cluster B to the public domain, as well as
to flexibilities and access to knowledge, indicate that these are considered a
legitimate part of a pro-development global intellectual property balance. A
substantive equality principle, if implemented within the new norm-setting
context to be created by the WIPO Development Agenda, would make a
difference in the way the WIPO Secretariat exercises its considerable
discretion to prioritize and implement its member-driven activities. Such a
principle would cause the various decision-making processes within the
institution to embrace the consideration of various social welfare goals in
addition to innovation.
A human development-driven approach to intellectual property, for
example, would be guided by the need to facilitate and prioritize access to
basic education. There are many ways in which this goal might be
by
facilitated, by broader exceptions and limitations to copyright,238 or
2 39
innovative activity premised on content within a robust public domain.

If

the WIPO eventually adopts a development as freedom approach to its
norm-setting activities, it might, for example, prioritize the Chilean proposal
within the SCCR. In addition to the general study the WIPO already
commissioned on exceptions and limitations in the digital environment, 240 it

would further investigate the use of flexibilities, specifically in the area of
development. Combined with a substantive equality principle, the WIPO
would focus on intellectual property rights and exceptions as policy tools
for enhancing access to knowledge generally and access to basic education
and advanced research specifically for development purposes-perhaps
even suggesting users' rights or substantive maxima that might override
national standards.2 4'
We now turn to our third and final proposal, which addresses global
intellectual property balance in the face of proliferating bilateral trade
instruments.

237.

PCDA FinalRecommendations, supranote 2, at annex

15-22. See also supra

Section I.C.
238.
239.

See Chon, supra note 8.
Pamela Samuelson, EnrichingDiscourse on Public Domains, 55 DuKE L.J. 783

(2006).
240. WIPO, SCCR, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and
Related Rights in the DigitalEnvironment, SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003).
241. See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 220-21 (advocating the use of
"substantive maxima" to preserve an international public domain of knowledge).
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IV. A DYNAMIC INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY BILATERAL TREATIES

A. Intellectual Property and Human Rights: the Emergence of Rules of
Customary International Law
After an initial reluctance to link international trade to intellectual
property protection within the WTO system, developing countries regarded
TRIPS as a safeguard against unilateral trade sanctions or bilateralism.
More than ten years after entering into the TRIPS Agreement, however, this
picture looks substantially different.242
TRIPS induced developing countries to engage in substantial reforms
of their intellectual property regimes. 43 But no serious initiatives were
adopted at an international level-whether bilateral or multilateral-to
implement the goals and principles set forth in articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS. In
addition, developing countries' expectations were not met as to the
increasing transfer of technology and investment flows that would result
from the reinforcement of intellectual property protection.2" Moreover, just
242. See experts conclusions of the European and Latin American Seminar organized
at the Law School of UBA (Universidad de Buenos Aires) Seminar held in Buenos Aires and
organized by L'Association Internationale de Droit Economique and CEIDIE-UBA: "El
acuerdo ADPIC 10 afios despurs:visiones cruzadas Europa y Latinoamrrica, October 31November 2, 2005 (only available in Spanish, Editorial La Ley, 2007; English translations
forthcoming).
243. After the TRIPS Agreement came into force on January 1, 1995, the United
States continued to make use of Section 301 of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act (inclusion of
countries in watch lists or trade sanctions) and monitor the performance of all countries on an
annual basis under its 301 process. United States bilateralism did not cease after that date. It
continued to negotiate intellectual property agreements with developing nations, bundling
intellectual property standards into agreements establishing free trade areas. See Peter
Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT XXX,

173 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002). Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
in 1994 and the adoption of TRIPS, many developing countries, including most Latin
American and Caribbean countries, introduced substantial changes in their intellectual
property regimes and domestic laws, thus beginning to reduce the pre-Uruguay Round
heterogeneity in intellectual property systems. Thus, recent modifications of national and
regional regimes implied the spreading out in Latin America and the Caribbean of stronger
intellectual property rights and their extension into new fields. See Mario Cimoli, Joao
Carlos Ferraz & Annalisa Primi, Science and Technology Policies in Open Economies: The
case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Serie Desarrollo Productivo,
No. 165, October 2005, p. 28.
244. As stressed in ECLAC's study,
above and beyond the evolution towards more homogeneous systems of
intellectual property management, Latin American and Caribbean countries
recently saw the coming out of disadvantages related with current running patterns
of IPrights and systems, mostly due to deep asymmetries between the region and
more advanced countries in terms of mastering IP related aspects. Actually, price
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before the end of the transitional period under article 65.2 of TRIPS, which
entitled developing countries to delay the application of the provisions of
TRIPS, the United States, and to a lesser extent the European Union, sought
to reinforce intellectual property rights beyond TRIPS via bilateral
agreements. 45
A new wave of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) reinforcing the
protection of intellectual property well beyond TRIPS standards has
emerged in the last seven years. The United States and the European Union
have concluded numerous FTAs with developing countries containing
specific provisions providing for the reinforcement of intellectual property
protection.2 46 These bilateral agreements build upon the international
of patented products and processes are augmenting, inducing vicious effects in the
region; furthermore, the increasing barriers posed to reverse engineering and
imitative practices, which had been a key pillar of South East Asian technological
catch up, limit and hinder domestic learning processes.
Cimoli, Ferraz & Primi supra note 243, at 28. In Southeast Asia, the number of residents'
patents is growing at a higher rate than those of non-residents, while in Latin America and
the Caribbean non-resident patenting leads the scene. In such a context, commercialization
of foreign products or processes is facilitated, while, very often, local technological
capabilities may be hindered. Divergence in the patent patterns and the asymmetry of
industrial specialization patterns and structure among countries has been regarded, among
other factors, as reasons to believe that a policy advocating for strong intellectual property
rights needs to be implemented in a cautious manner. Throughout history, stronger
intellectual property systems have tended to be the result of technological development and
the creation of firms capable of taking advantage of these systems, at least as much as they
have been the cause of development. See BRONWYN H. HALL, GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR
http://iris37.worldbank.org/do(2005),
30
AMERICA,
IN
LATIN
INNOVATION
mdoc/PRD/Other/PRDDContainer.nsfYWBViewAttachments?ReadForm&ID=85256D2400
766CC785257184005C2B2B&.
245. The United States is exporting its high level of intellectual property rights
protection by means of a new generation of free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded largely
with developing countries. As Professor Abbot emphasizes, "these levels of protection
exceed those required by the TRIPS Agreement which establishes minimum substantive
Frederick Abbot,
standards of protection and enforcement for all WTO Members."
IntellectualPropertyProvisions of Bilateraland Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S.
Federal Law (ICTSD Issue Paper No. 12, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20064_en.pdf.
246. Thus, for instance, most FTAs require an extension of patent terms for
pharmaceutical products (or other regulated products) to "compensate" for unreasonable
curtailment of the patent term based on regulatory review procedures. See Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Bahr., art. 14; United
States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.9.6 (requiring the term extension of
patents, beyond Article 33 of TRIPS that requires protection for at least 20 years from filing
date, upon request for delays, which must include five years form filing and three years from
examination request). Some FTAs require the Parties to allow patent holders to block
parallel imports of patents products and to "provide to authors, performers, and producers of
phonograms the right to ... prohibit the importation into that Party's territory of copies of
the work, performance, or phonogram that are made... outside that Party's territory with the
authorization of the author, performer, or producer of the phonogram." See United States -
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architecture of intellectual property rights, and establish as a major principle
that nothing in the agreements derogates from the obligations and rights of
the parties by virtue of TRIPS or other multilateral intellectual property
agreements administered by the WIPO (hereinafter, referred to as the "nonderogation clause" or "principle") .247 They also encompass the national
treatment principle of non-discrimination between nationals of the countries
that are parties to the FTAs. 248 As a consequence of the most-favored nation
principle in TRIPS, the advantages, benefits, and privileges granted by the
FTAs to nationals of another WTO Member are typically accorded to the
nationals of all other members of the WTO, with exceptions such as
customs unions and free trade areas pursuant to GATT XXIV. 24 9

The FTAs focus on specific issues not fully dealt with to the
satisfaction of the United States or the European Union in TRIPS. In other
words, the major trading powers enlarged and intensified the intellectual
property agenda through the last generation of FTAs. These contain
detailed provisions on domain names on the Internet, related rights of
performers and producers of phonograms, remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures, effective legal remedies

Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, arts. 15.9.4, 15.5. Some FTAs extended
patentable subject matters to areas where TRIPS provided for some degree of flexibility or
freedom to WTO Member States. See id art.15.9.2 (requiring Morocco to make patents
available to plants and animals); Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art
4.18, authorizing exclusions form patentability only on grounds of ordre public or for
treatment of humans or animals); Memorandum of Understanding on Issues Related to the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Under the Agreement Between the United States
and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, 5, Oct. 24, 2000,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade -Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/Annexes/asset-upload- file 12
0_8462.pdf (accompanying the U.S.-Jordan FTA and requiring Jordan not to exclude
"business methods or computer-related inventions" from patent protection). Similarly, in the
field of trademarks, the scope of protection of the so-called "well-known trademarks" has
been increased in several FTAs which require Parties to give effect to WIPO's Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks. See
WIPO, General Report, A/34/16 (Sept. 29, 1999). WIPO's Joint Recommendation sets forth
higher standards of protection of well known trademarks and is treated in some FTAs as if it
were a Treaty and not merely a declaration or soft law. See Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free
Trade Area, supra, art. 4; Christine Haight Farley, "The Scope of Trademark Protection in
Free Trade Agreements", Briefing Paper, Workshop on "Negotiating Intellectual Property
Provisions in Free Trade Agreements", Miami, November 19, 2003, (The Program on IP and
the Public Interest Washington College of Law, Washington, The Consumer Project on
Technology, Washington and CEIDIE, Buenos Aires, Argentina).
247. See United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 246, art. 17.1.5;
infra Section IV.B.
248. See United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 246, art. 17.1.6.
249. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 5, at 55.
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to protect rights management information, and protection of encrypted
program-carrying satellite signals."'
In areas already encompassed by TRIPS, FTAs expand the coverage
of trademarks and the protection of pharmaceutical products."'
For
example, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) expands
protection by different means, namely the establishment of a new category
of rights by providing exclusive protection with respect to information or
data previously used to obtain marketing or sanitary approvals. This
category of exclusive rights, unknown for many developing countries
counterparts previous to the signature of the last generation of FTAs, entails
the prohibition of the use of undisclosed test or other data, that is,
undisclosed information about the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical
products for five years from the date of its marketing or sanitary approval."'2
As stated recently, "[t]his relatively new form of IP protects
investment in clinical trials for the marketing approval of pharmaceuticals
and agrochemicals, rather than in a particular form of innovation o[r]
creation. Therefore, it pushes the limits of traditional intellectual property
to the pure protection of commercial assets.253 In turn, this has a major
impact on generic competition and public health. 54
Clearly, these FTAs contain so-called TRIPS-plus provisions, either
by establishing higher standards of protection going beyond those required
by the TRIPS Agreement or by eroding or eliminating the existing
flexibilities under TRIPS, or even by wiping out what was considered an

250. See United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 246, arts. 17.3,
17.7.5(d), 17.7.6(b), 17.8; United States - Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 246,
arts. 15.3, 15.8.
251. See Pedro Roffe, David Vivas & Gina Vea, Maintaining Policy Space for
Development: A Case Study on IP Technical Assistance in FTAs tbis. 1 & 2 (ICTSD Issue
Paper No. 19, 2007), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Roffe-VivasVea%20Bluel9.pdf; see, e.g., United States - Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note
246, arts. 15.2, 15.10.
252. See Carlos Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO
System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79, 85-88 (2004).
253. Roffe, Vivas & Vea, supra note 251 at 5; see, e.g., United States - Singapore
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.8.1; United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 246, arts. 17.9, 17.10; Pedro Roffe, Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus
World The Chile-USA Free Trade Agreement 24-26 (Quaker Int'l Affairs Programme
TRIPS Issue Paper No. 4, 2004), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/Bilateral-Agreements-and-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf.

254. In recognition of this, the U.S. Congress recently reached an agreement with the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, softening some of the provisions in the FTAs
pertaining to test data, and reiterating local flexibilities in setting patent terms and remedies
for infringement. See OFFICE OF

THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT
ON TRADE POLICY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS (2007), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/

DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/2007/asset upload file31211 283.pdf.
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option of WTO Members.255 At first glance, FTAs entail, in general terms, a
departure from the basic principles and objectives of articles 7 or 8 of
TRIPS.
However, there is still room to implement the principles of articles 7
and 8 by seeking an appropriate interaction between human rights and
intellectual property rights.256 In such a context, general principles and rules
of public international law may be of great help. According to the WTO
DSU, WTO panels are required to apply such principles and rules.257 They
may also help to establish some limits from outside the FTAs to the everexpanding intellectual property protection under such agreements, which go
far beyond TRIPS.
The declared objectives of FTAs are vast. They seek to avoid
distortions in the reciprocal trade relations between parties. In the case of
the U.S.-Peru FTA, mention is made to the goal of enhancing the standard

255. A case in point is the option under article 27.3(b) to protect plant varieties, either
by patents, an effective sui generis system, or by any combination thereof. This provision
had to be reviewed after four years of the date of entry into the WTO Agreement.
Discussions as to the scope, objective, and extent of such review has lead to very interesting
debates within the TRIPS Council, and its revision or modification is still pending. In
addition, under paragraph 3(a) of article 27 of TRIPS, Members may also exclude diagnostic,
therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals from patentability.
Under paragraph 2 of article 27 of TRIPS, Members of the WTO "may exclude from
patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation
of which [within their territory] is necessary to protect ordrepublic or morality, including to
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment
.... TRIPS,. supra note 4, art. 27.2. Some FTAs recently concluded by the United States
with developing countries only repeat and stress paragraph I of article 27, which only
foresees the obligation to provide patent protection, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology. See TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 27. 1. By doing so, some commentators
have concluded that flexibilities and options under paragraph 2 and 3 of article 27 of TRIPS
have been given away and, therefore, by means of the most favored nation principle of article
4 of TRIPS, rights or concessions granted by one WTO Member State to nationals of another
Member State in the framework of an FTA shall extend to all other nationals of the other
WTO Member States. See Josef Drexi, The Evolution of TRIPS: Towards Flexible
Multilateralism, Seminar, El acuerdo ADPIC 10 ahos despu~s:visiones cruzadas Europay
Latinoam~rica, held at the University of Buenos Aires Law School by L'Association
Internationale de Droit Economique and CEIDIE-UBA, Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 2005. With respect
to the TRIPS-plus aspects of FTAs in the field of patents, see J-F. Morin, "La brevetabiliti
dans les r~cents traitdsde libre-6changeamericans", (2004) RIDE 4, 483-501.
256. See generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES (Abbott, et al. eds., 2006).
257. The general rule of interpretation of treaties enunciates that not only the context
shall be taken into account but also any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, art. 3.2, 33
I.L.M. 1125, (1994); Vienna Convention supra note 118, art. 31,
3(c); see also tRIC
CANAL-FORGUES, LE RtGLEMENT DES DIFFItRENDS A L'OMC 102-121 (2d ed. 2003).
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of living and reducing poverty.258 The U.S.-Chile agreement has a special
preamble to the Intellectual Property Chapter, where the importance of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement on Public Health is
recognized. 59 In other cases, like in the Central American Free Trade
Agreement, the Doha Declaration is omitted, but a side letter or
understanding executed by the parties recognizes its importance and
emphasizes that nothing in the chapter on intellectual property of the
CAFTA Agreement hampers the ability of the parties to adopt measures
necessary to promote access to medicines for all, in particular with regards
to cases of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics or
diseases."6 Furthermore, in different FTAs, recognition of the importance
of access to medicines is further evidenced either in the text or in the form
of side letters or understandings: intellectual property provisions in FTAs
shall not impede parties from making use of and implementing the so-called
Paragraph Six Solution of the Doha Declaration with regard to countries
facing a public health emergency and lacking manufacturing abilities to
produce the needed medicines.261 Recently, the U.S. Congress reiterated

258. See United States - Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, pmbl., Apr.
12, 2006.
259. See United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 246, at ch. 17 pmbl.
("Recognizing the principles set out in the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement on Public
Health, adopted on November 14, 2001, by the WTO at the Fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference, held in Doha.").
260. See Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures, Aug. 5, 2004,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTADRFinalTexts/asset upload file697_3975.pdfht = (all the Parties to the Agreement agreed
that the obligations of Chapter Fifteen (Intellectual Property Rights) "do not affect a Party's
ability to take necessary measures to protect public health by promoting access to medicines
for all, in particular concerning cases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other
epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency."). See also
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FREE TRADE WITH COLUMBIA: SUMMARY OF
UNITED
STATES COLUMBIA
TRADE PROMOTION
AGREEMENT
5 (2007),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2007/asset-upload-file820
1307
- .
3.pdfht=
261. See General Council, Implementation of Paragraph6 of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003); General Council,
General Council Chairperson's Statement, WT/GC/M/82 (Nov. 13, 2003). This decision has
been conceived to enable the WTO member countries lacking capacity in pharmaceuticals to
make effective use of compulsory licensing. See Understanding Regarding Certain Public
Health Measures, supra note 260, (noting that all the Parties to the CAFTA Agreement
agreed that: "In recognition of the commitment to access to medicines that are supplied in
accordance with the Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003 on the
Implementation of Paragraph Six of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
public health (WT/L/540) and the WTO General Council Chairman's statement
accompanying the Decision (JOB (03)/177, WT/GC/M182) (collectively the TRIPS/health
solution"), Chapter Fifteen (Intellectual Property) does not prevent the effective utilization of
the TRIPS/health solution"); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra
note 260.
THE
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that in the U.S.-Peru and U.S.-Panama FTAs, the side letters "should be
' 262
made part of the text of the FTA.
Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement entitles any WTO Member
country to enhance intellectual property protection, provided that such
263
reinforcement of protection is not inconsistent with the Agreement itself.
This means that TRIPS-plus provisions are in principle a valid
manifestation of WTO Member sovereign powers, further confirmed by the
pacta sunt servanda rule embodied in all of the recent FTAs. Thus, article
15.1 of the CAFTA Agreement requires parties at "a minimum" to give
effect to Chapter Fifteen (Intellectual Property Rights) of the Agreement
and further entitles parties "to grant more extensive protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights" in their domestic laws than is
required under that Chapter, provided that such protection is not
inconsistent with the FTAs. 64
. However, when it comes to interpreting TRIPS-plus provisions of
FTAs (and domestic implementing legislation thereof), one important
question arises: should TRIPS-plus provisions be interpreted in light of the
text of the TRIPS. Agreement by itself, or should they be analyzed in light of
the Doha Declarations as well? One should bear in mind that Paragraph 17
of the Doha Declaration of November 14, 2001, stresses the importance of
interpreting and applying TRIPS in a manner that supports the goal of
promoting public health through both access to existing medicines and
through research and development (R&D) in new medicines. 65 The
262. See Letter from Charles B. Rangel & Sander M. Levin, Ways & Means
Committee Chairman & Trade Subcommittee Chairman, United States House of
Representatives, to Susan C. Schwab, United States Representative (May 10, 2007),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Media/pdf/l10/05%2014%2007/05%2014%
2007.pdf; William New, US to Loosen Drug PatentProvisions in Some Trade Deals, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH, May 17, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=622.
263. See TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 1.1. ("Members shall give effect to the provisions
of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more
extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does
not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice.").
264. See The Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade
Agreement, art. 15.1, Aug. 5, 2004, [hereinafter CAFTA] ("Each Party shall, at a minimum,
give effect to this Chapter. A Party may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in its
domestic law more extensive protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights than
is required under this Chapter, provided that such protection and enforcement does not
contravene this Chapter."); see also United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note
246, art. 17.1.
265. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l,
17, 41 I.L.M. 746, ("We stress the importance we attach to
implementation and interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner supportive of public health, by promoting
both access to existing medicines and research and development into new medicines and, in
this connection, are adopting a separate Declaration.").
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importance of access to medicines is further emphasized in Paragraph Four
of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, adopted on the same
day,266 as well as in the subsequent General Council Decision. Taking into
account the clear objectives of these subsequent agreements under an
evolutive interpretive principle, may a FTA derogate from access to
medicines or create substantial barriers therein for the purpose of
reinforcing patent rights beyond TRIPS?
The Doha Declarations, both of which were unanimously adopted by
WTO Members after entering into the TRIPS Agreement, may be regarded
as a normative framework that may establish certain limits to the free will of
the parties to a subsequent treaty. They express universal acknowledgment
of a fundamental human right that may not be automatically discarded by
intellectual property rights-that is, the right to life, which subsumes within
it the right to health, and its more evident expression, access to medicines.
In the context of TRIPS, Frederick Abbott has stated that
If a peremptory human rights norm is engaged then, as prescribed by Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the AB would be required
to void any conflicting rule (or the entire offending agreement). Thus, if the right
to life is a peremptory norm, and if the mandatory patenting of pharmaceuticals
directly conflicted with the right to life (hypothetically),
267 the AB would be required
to voidthe applicable rule of the TRIPS Agreement.,

The Doha Declarations thus might establish one bridge between
intellectual property protection and human rights. The former are not
absolute and may not be conceived without certain limits. In fact, such
equilibrium or interaction between intellectual property rights and human
rights already exists under domestic law. 268 The Doha Declarations also
enable this interaction to take place in international law. In this context, the
266. "We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection,
we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose." Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, supra note 120, 4.
267. Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS and Human Rights: Preliminary Reflections, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 256, at 145, 158; accord Simon
Walker, A Human Rights Approach to the WTO's TRIPS Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 256, at 171, 176 ("The right to health ... includes a
right to affordable, essential drugs, as set out in the WHO's essential drug list."); see also
Frederick M. Abbott, The 'Rule of Reason' and the Right to Health: Integrating Human
Rights and Competition Principles in the Context of TRIPS, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 279, 279-283 (Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Biirgi
Bonanomi, eds., 2005) (detailing the various treaty provisions that form a basis for a right to
health).
268. Cf Christophe Geiger, FundamentalRights, a Safeguardfor the Coherence of
IntellectualProperty Law?, 35 INT'L REv. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L., 268-80 (2004).
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entire TRIPS machinery, together with its Declarations and the General
Council Decision, could be considered an integralframework that enshrines
the rights to life and health, and the consequent ability of states to adopt
measures to protect these rights in cases of emergencies or epidemics. If
opinio juris exists at a universal level, as evidenced in international
declarations and human rights conventions and coupled with a coherent
state practice, we could be witnessing the emergence of an imperative rule
of international law that may be balanced against-or even preemptintellectual property protection.
Key to this approach is understanding that the relationship of human
rights to intellectual property is dynamic. WTO Member states are moving
decisively in the direction of the incorporation of the rights to life and health
(and therefore access to medicines) within the TRIPS integral framework,
subject at a very minimum to a balance with intellectual property rights.269
A more generous view would accord these human rights precedence over
intellectual property rights. For example, one interpretative approach
towards the FTAs could consider the rights to life and health as possible
core human rights, as evidenced by the integral framework provided by the
Doha Declarations and the General Council Decision. Again in the context
of TRIPS, Abbott has stated,
The identification of core rights may be important in applying human rights in the
interpretation and application of the TRIPS Agreement. If a human right is
considered "core," inviolable and non-relative, then such right may not be subject
to "balancing" as against non-core or relative interests. If the concept
of core
270
rights has currency, the "right to life" would certainly be among them.

As expressed through the TRIPS integral framework, the right to life
may even be evolving towards a peremptory norm of general international
law, the so-called jus cogens, which is defined by the VCLT as "a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
269. Abbott, supra note 267, at 146-47 ("Meetings in the TRIPS Council on access to
medicines that ultimately resulted in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health flowed largely from efforts by developing WTO Members to deal with public
health problems affecting their people. The TRIPS Council did not begin taking access to
medicines issues seriously because the OECD governments became more enlightened about
the consequences of TRIPS and patents. Rather, this took place because the worldwide
public did not accept that the rights of pharmaceutical industry patent holders should take
precedence over the rights to life and health of millions of individuals. The human rights
dimension will play a substantial role in the response of the WTO and other multilateral
organizations to public health issues. It is precisely because fundamental human rights are at
stake, and that these rights are paramount in public consciousness, that the legal situation will
adapt.").
270. Id. at 147-48 ("Non-core rights are relative in differing degrees. Non-core
human rights may be the subject of progressive realization. Important examples are the right
to education and the right to health.").
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The main feature of such rules is their indelibility.272

The least controversial examples ofjus cogens are the prohibition of the use
of force, the law of genocide, the principle of racial discrimination, crimes
against humanity, and the rules prohibiting slaves and piracy. The principle
of permanent sovereignty over the natural resources and the principle of
self-determination also have this special status.2 73 The TRIPS integral
framework suggests that the right to life (subsuming the right to health and
therefore access to medicines) is moving towards incorporation within such
a corpus of law. The eventual outcome would be a right not disposable by
the parties to a treaty and superseding the legal framework that states may
establish through such a treaty.274
In sum, TRIPS-plus provisions in the FTAs could be valid only to the
extent that they do not derogate, substantially reduce the scope, or neutralize
the right to life (or another fundamental human right).
B. The Relationship of States' Obligations to States' Rights: The NonDerogation Principle
Non-derogation of rights and obligations arising out of TRIPS and
other multilateral conventions on intellectual property protection as
embodied in certain FTAs could determine the scope of the commitments
undertaken by the parties to such trade agreements. The non-derogation
principle is also an important interpretative tool that might bridge
intellectual property and human rights.
The TRIPS Agreement contains a non-derogation principle but it is
limited to obligations under existing intellectual property conventions.
TRIPS article 2.2 states:
Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations
that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne
Convention, the Rome Convention
and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in
275
Respect of Integrated Circuits.

The purpose of this clause is to prevent parties from using TRIPS as an
excuse for not complying with pre-existing commitments between WTO
271.
272.

Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 53.
L

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

488-89 (6th ed.

2003) ("They are rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence
but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of a contrary effect.").
273. Id.
274. As Jean Combacau and Serge Sur contend, Ius cogens rules are to be
distinguished from ordinary mandatory rules in the sense that a breach of an ordinary
obligatory rule entails the international responsibility of the defaulting State while a violation
of a ius cogens rule leads to the absolute nullity of the treaty which is contrary to such
imperative rule. See JEAN

COMBACAU & SERGE SUR, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

ed. 1997).
275. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 2.2.
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Member countries.276 TRIPS article 2.2 is confined to obligations of
Member states under specified multilateral conventions that existed prior to
TRIPS.
The non-derogation clauses in FTAs have a broader scope in certain
cases. Thus, the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement article 17.1.5 establishes
that:
Nothing in this Chapter concerning intellectual property rights shall derogate from
the obligations and rights of one Party with respect to the other by virtue of the
TRIPS Agreement or multilateral intellectualproperty agreements concluded or
administered
under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization
2 77
(wIPO).

A non-derogation provision is also contained in article 1.3 of the
CAFTA Agreement, which links the United States to all the Central
American States, in the form of a confirmation by the parties of the rights
and obligations arising from "the WTO and other agreements" to which
they are parties. Furthermore, in article 15.7 of CAFTA, "the Partiesaffirm
their existing rights and obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and
intellectual property agreements concluded or administered under the
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and to
which they are party.2 7' Therefore, non-derogation clauses in FTAs are in
some cases not only concerned with obligations, but also with rights under
preexisting multilateral treaties on intellectual property
Thus, the non-derogation clauses, as included in some of the abovementioned FTAs, are wider than the one included in TRIPS. They are not
only aimed at preventing the FTAs from working to the detriment of the
obligations previously undertaken by the states under intellectual property
multilateral agreements within the scope of the WIPO, but they also ensure
276.

See

RESOURCE BOOK ON

TRIPS

AND DEVELOPMENT,

supra note 193, at 50;

Roffe, supra note 253, at 15. In this sense, in the EC-Bananasarbitrationunder the WTO
dispute settlement machinery which involved, inter alia, a discussion as to the level of
suspension of concessions applied to the EC, arbitrators referred to article 2.2 stressing that:
This provision can be understood to refer to the obligations that the contracting
parties of the Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions and the IPIC Treaty, who are
also WTO Members, have between themselves under these four treaties. This
would mean that, by virtue of the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, e.g. Berne
Union members cannot derogate from existing obligations between each other
under the Berne Convention. For example, the fact that Article 9.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement incorporates into that Agreement Articles 1-21 of the Berne
Convention with the exception of Article 6bis [sic] does not mean that Berne
Union members would henceforth be exonerated from this obligation to guarantee
moral rights under the Berne Convention.
Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities - Regime for the Importation,Sale and
Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under
Article 22.6 of the DSU, 149, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
277. United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 246, art. 17.5 (emphasis
added).
278. CAFTA, supranote 264, art. 15.7.
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that the rights of those states under these agreements, including the TRIPS
Agreement, are not derogated by the FTAs. In fact, the non-derogation
clause in those FTAs encompasses not only all agreements administered by
the WIPO but also all the provisions of TRIPS.
What is meant by the "rights and obligations" of the parties under
these multilateral agreements?
The notion of "obligations" under the
agreements administered or sponsored by the WIPO or under TRIPS seems
to be clear. By signing FTAs, states cannot free themselves from the
obligations they have undertaken as regards the protection of the IPR under
the agreements administered or sponsored by the WIPO or under TRIPS.
They must always acknowledge the rights and privileges recognized therein
to IPRs holders.
However, what are the states' "rights" under said agreements and
under TRIPS? The answer to this question is more complex. For instance, a
right according to TRIPS would mean that a party may make use of the
flexibilities and exceptions allowed by the TRIPS Agreement, including the
"right to protect public health" reiterated by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health.279 Nevertheless, if a state waives a right by virtue of an
FTA, what is the effect of the non-derogation clause?
Arguably, the non-derogation clause will not be effective in the
presence of an express waiver given by a party to an FTA to apply an
exception or to make use of a flexibility acknowledged in TRIPS. If, for
instance, a party to an FTA explicitly waived certain freedoms arising under
the TRIPS Agreement, such as the freedom to choose the system of
exhaustion of rights under its domestic laws based on the existing
permission under article 6 of TRIPS, then the non-derogation clause would
have no effect in view of the fact that under article 1.1 of TRIPS, members
of the WTO may grant a greater degree of intellectual property protection
than that acknowledged in TRIPS on the sole condition that its provisions
are not violated. In such a case, the obligation of a state under a FTA to
adopt territorial exhaustion would thus entail a strengthening of the patent's
holder exclusive right to import and would be primafacie lawful.
By contrast, the non-derogation clause would have full effect as
regards those provisions included in TRIPS that had not been the subject of
an explicit waiver by the party to an FTA. Thus, taking into account that the
waiver of sovereign powers should be interpreted restrictively,28 ° any
flexibility or restriction to the IPRs allowed under the TRIPS Agreement
279. Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 120, 4 (affirming
"WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.") (emphasis added).

280. This conclusion derives from the very concept of sovereignty, the so-called
reserved domain of the States and the principle of sovereign equality of States under public
international law. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Dailler &
Alain Pellet, Droit InternationalPublic 404-16, 411 (4th ed. 1993).
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that has not been expressly abdicated would fall within the umbrella of the
non-derogation clause and would, therefore, survive.
In that sense, the mere presence of a non-derogation clause such as the
one included in some of the FTAs described above would be significant
enough to put a curb on the non-violation complaints that a party to an FTA
may file against another. At present, these kinds of claims cannot be filed
under the TRIPS Agreement due to the existence of a de facto moratorium
in this regard as a result of a disagreement between WTO Member states.281
However, non-violation complaints are expressly contemplated in the
CAFTA Agreement and in the FTA between the United Sates and Morocco,
among others. 82 Non-violation complaints can be filed by a party when a
domestic measure of another party, although not unlawful under the FTA,
may frustrate or make it difficult for the former to benefit from certain
advantages arising under the treaty.283 In such context, the existence of a
non-derogation clause in an FTA may play a significant role by pointing out
281.
Article 64.1 of the TRIPS Agreement established initially that "Subparagraphs 1
(b) and (c) of Article XXIII of GATT' 1994 shall not apply to the settlement of disputes under
this Agreement for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement." TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 64.1. Procedural rules on Subparagraphs 1 (b) and
(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 relating to "non-violation" complaints are incorporated
as article 26.1 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU"). Non-violation complaints are possible for goods and
services (under GATT for goods and market-opening commitments in services). However,
for the time being, members have agreed not to use them under the TRIPS Agreement. Under
article 64.2 this "moratorium" (i.e., the agreement not to use TRIPS non-violation cases) was
to last for the first five years of the WTO (i.e., 1995-99). It has been extended since then.
The TRIPS Council has discussed whether non-violation complaints should be allowed in
intellectual property, and if so, to what extent and how ("scope and modalities") they could
be brought to the WTO's dispute settlement procedures. At least two countries (the U.S. and
Switzerland) say non-violation cases should be allowed in order to discourage members from
engaging in "creative legislative activity" that would allow them to get around their TRIPS
commitments. Most would like to see the moratorium continued or made permanent. Some
have suggested additional safeguards. However, no consensus has been reached. The
August 1, 2004 General Council (of WTO) decision (the "July 2004 package") extended the
moratorium. See TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 64.2; WTO Secretariat, Background and the
Current Situation, available at: http://www.wto.int/english/tratop e/tripse/nonviolationbackgrounde.htm.
282. United States - Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 246, art. 20.2(c);
CAFTA, supra note 264, annex 20.2.1(e). As stated in a report of the South Centre,
"Bilateral Agreements such as the recently concluded US-Chile, Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and US-Australia, for instance, irrevocably place intellectual
property within the scope of non-violation complaints. ... The effects of these complaints
in relation to the rights of the Parties to regulate intellectual property in the public interest
could be significant... [and may make developing countries] more vulnerable to pressure to
refrain from using flexibilities offered by intellectual property standards." Intellectual
Property and Development: Overview of Developments in Multilateral, Plurilateral,and
Bilateral Fora, INTELL. PROP. Q. UPDATE, First Quarter 2004, available at
http://www.southcentre.org/info/sccielipquarterly/ipdev2004ql .pdf.
283. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 5, at 513-14.
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that any sovereign power or right of a state existing under a multilateral
treaty on intellectual property protection (e.g., the right to make use of
certain exceptions or flexibilities, or the right to adopt domestic measures to
protect the environment or public health) that has not been expressly waived
under an FTA continues to survive. Consequently, any lawful government
measure taken under a multilateral treaty on intellectual property protection
could not be questioned by means of a non-violation complaint under an
FTA.
Another issue that emerges with respect to the scope of the nonderogation clause is to determine which are the treaties "sponsored" by the
WIPO and therefore reached by such clause. Is the UPOV agreement
administered by a governmental body other than the WIPO a "WIPOsponsored agreement?" '' If this is so, the exceptions that would correspond
under either the 1978 or the 1991 UPOV Convention (the experimental use,
the plant breeder, and the farmer exceptions provided therein) would be a
right of the states that are parties thereto and would be considered valid and
surviving if said states are, in turn, parties to an FTA that contains a nonderogation clause as the ones previously analyzed. To the extent that the
FTA does not state or reflect clearly an express waiver of the states of any
of the exceptions established in treaties like the UPOV agreement (i.e., the
1991 Convention and in particular the 1978 one, which contains wider
exceptions to the plant breeder's exclusive rights), these exceptions, again,
would survive. When there is a doubt about whether a domestic measure of
a state based on the exceptions established in any of the UPOV Conventions
is consistent with the FTA, the non-derogation clause could be a helpful
guideline to maintain the national measure. Thus, the non-derogation clause
is undoubtedly a significant interpretative criterion in the disputes arising
from FTAs containing this kind of safeguard.285
C. The Relationship of the Non-Derogation Principle to the Freedom of
Implementation Principle
After stressing the obligation of WTO Members to give effect to the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, TRIPS article 1.1 establishes that
"Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system
andpractice." In that sense, TRIPS confirms a general customary rule of
284. The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) is
an intergovernmental organization with headquarters in Geneva (Switzerland). UPOV was
established by the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.
The UPOV Convention was adopted in Paris in 1961 and it was revised in 1972, 1978 and
1991. The objective of the Convention is the protection of new varieties of plants by an
intellectual property right. Text of the conventions available at: http://www.upov.int/.
285. In a similar sense but with a more cautious optimism in this regard, see Roffe,
supranote 253, at 16.
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international law that methods employed by states to apply and implement
their international obligations within their territories are left to the domestic
law of each state. 286 This fundamental principle has allowed the United
States and the European Union to deny the self-executing character and
direct.effect of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement itself.28 FTAs do
not reproduce expressly this principle. They only emphasize the states'
obligation to apply their provisions, which is the repetition of the rule that
compels the states to fulfil their international obligations in good faith
(pacta sunt servanda).
The absence of an analogous principle of freedom of implementation
within the FTAs is bearing asymmetric results. Thus, the United States
continues to follow its legal tradition of denying: (1) the self-executing
character and direct effect of the treaties related to economic and
commercial matters in its territory; (2) the right of individuals to invoke or
enforce the FTAs' provisions before domestic courts on the basis of an
alleged inconsistency between domestic implementing laws and the text of
the treaty itself; or (3) the supremacy of international law over domestic
law, as is usual in a large number of developing countries.288 By contrast,
286. This means that, in principle, public international law is not concerned with the
means but with the results: the lack of adaptation of domestic law to international obligations
leads to the international responsibility of the defaulting State. See MONCAYO, ET AL.,
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL POBLIcO 56, Tomo 1, (Zavalia, ed., 4a. reimpresi6n, 1994).

287. With regard to such practice in the United States and in the European Union, see
Moncayo von Hase, Andrds, The Application and Interpretationof the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 108-18 (1998). See also European Court of Justice decisions in ECJ-

Portugal/Council, C-149/96 -European Court Reports (EPR) 1999, 1-8395 and Dior and
Layher, joint cases C-300/98 and C-392-ECR 2000, 1-11307 (all the decisions are also
available on the Court's website at http://curia.eu.int); Walter Klin, Implementing Treaties
in Domestic Law: from Pacta Sunt Servanda to Anything Goes, in 47 MULTILATERAL
TREATY-MAKING 111-128 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ed., 2000). With respect to the denial of
the direct effect and self-executing character of FTAs' provisions under US practice, see
Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade
Agrements in Light of US. FederalLaw, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable
Development, February 2006. The U.S. and European Union practice puts countries
acknowledging direct effects to self-executing provisions of treaties under their domestic
law, as it is the case in many developing countries, at disadvantage vis-6-vis countries like
the United States which do not allow individuals to invoke treaty provisions or rights before
domestic courts.
288. Section 102 of the Dominican Republic-CentralAmerican-United States Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act is a typical provision denying self-executing effect to
treaty rules no matter how clear and complete the rules may be:
Sec. 102. RELATIONSHIP OF THE AGREEMENT TO UNITED STATES AND
STATE LAW
(a) RELATIONSHIP OF AGREEMENT TO UNITED STATES LAW.
(1) UNITED STATES LAW TO PREVAIL IN CONFLICT.-No provision
of the Agreement, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, which is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall
have effect.
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the lack of any reference to this principle of freedom of implementation
within the FTAs is clearly felt in the implementation process of the
obligations arising from FTAs by the Central American countries and the
Dominican Republic. This process is being monitored by the United States,
which makes the effective application of the CAFTA conditional on the
introduction of the TRIPS-plus standards of FTAs into the domestic
legislations of the parties. Thus, the implementing legislation itself has
become the subject matter of on-going negotiations with the United States.
These run the risk of eliminating the flexibilities that may still be found in
the FTAs themselves or of preventing the parties from interpreting and
applying their international commitments in the way most suitable to their
domestic interests. The ability of the CAFTA countries to resort to the
implementing legislation as a method to establish a balance between the
TRIPS-plus provisions of FTAs and the social needs of their population as
technology users has been reduced. 89
Taking into account the said asymmetry in the processes of
implementation of the FTAs and their legal and political effects, the nonderogation principle may play a significant role at the time of assessing the
validity of the additional TRIPS- or FTA-plus concessions that states may
be forced to introduce in their domestic implementing legislation.
International law prevails over domestic law, pursuant to article 27 of the
(2) CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this Act shall be construed(A) to amend or modify any law of the United States; or
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United
States, unless provided for in this Act.
(b) RELATIONSHIP OF AGREEMENT TO STATE LAW.(1) LEGAL CALLENGE.-No State law, or the application thereof, may be
declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the
provision or application is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an
action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or
application invalid....
(c) EFFECT OF AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PRIVATE REMEDIES.No person other than the United States(1) shall have any cause of action or defense under the Agreement or by virtue
of congressional approval thereof; or
(2) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any
action or inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the
United States, or any political subdivision of a State, on the ground that such
action or inaction is inconsistent with the Agreement
Section 102 of the Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005).
289. Officials of developing countries who took part or were involved in the
negotiations with the United States on the implementing legislation of the FTAs have
publicly acknowledged in several academic seminars and international cooperation forums
that this process has degenerated into the introduction of additional TRIPS-plus demands by
the United States not provided for in the FTAs. See, e.g., WIPO Regional Meeting of the
Heads of Intellectual Property Offices, June 2006; WIPO-ECLAC Courses and Expert
Meeting Groups on Intellectual Property, 2004-2007.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.29 ° In some states, the
constitutional systems acknowledge the supremacy of international law over
the domestic law. In such cases especially, a domestic rule arising from an
FTA's implementation legislation that eliminates a flexibility or public
policy space provided in the TRIPS Agreement or a WIPO treaty that had
not been subject to an express derogation in an FTA may be invalidated on
the grounds that it is contrary to the non-derogation obligation established in
the FTA.
The United States practice of denying the self-executing character of
FTA provisions which is consistent with previous and past practice in the
same direction towards bilateral or multilateral economic or trade
agreements shows that the freedom of implemention principle remains a
general customary rule of international law. Therefore, said principle, as
well as the non-derogation clause, will be extremely useful at the time of
evaluating the effects and legal value that should be conferred to simplified
agreements, "understandings," or "side letters" that the parties to the FTAs
have signed in the form of a separate document with the United States in
areas sensitive to their interests. Thus, for instance, the Central American
countries and Peru have signed an understanding on public health with the
" ' In addition, Peru has signed a side letter with the United
United States.29
States in which both countries acknowledge the importance of the
protection of biodiversity.29 2 To the extent that these side letters or
understandings are not part of the FTAs' texts, they would, in principle, be
excluded from the dispute resolution system set forth in those treaties. This
would entail a difficulty for the states interested in claiming or enforcing the
fulfilment of these treaty provisions.
However, nothing prevents the states from granting the side letters or
understanding the status of an agreement or autonomous international
treaty, which can be invoked within their territories by individuals before
domestic courts on the basis of the principle of freedom of implementation
290. See Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 27 (codifying preexisting
customary rules on the matter by stating: "Internal law and observance of treaties: A party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty.").
291. Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures, supra note 260,
292. The governments of Peru and the United States, for instance, have signed two
"side letters." See Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures, supra note
260; Understanding Regarding Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12,
2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/PeruTPA/FinalTexts/assetupload file719_9535.pdfht=. As stated earlier, the U.S. Congress has
directed the USTR to accord the side letter on public health the status of treaty text. In the
Understanding regarding Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge "the parties recognize the
importance of the following: (1) obtaining consent from the appropriate authority prior to
accessing genetic resources under the control of such authority; (2) equitable sharing the
benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge and generic resources; and (3)
promoting quality patent examination to ensure the conditions of patentability are satisfied."
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and the non-derogation clause. This means that the implementation and
incorporation of a side letter or an understanding into the domestic law
based on said principles will enable states to justify or defend the
conservation, execution or implementation of their public and legislative
policies aimed at preserving the public health, protecting biodiversity, and
regulating access to genetic resources in accordance with the principles of
the Doha Declarations or the Convention on Biodiversity,293 as the case may
be.
CONCLUSION

Arguably, all member states, whether developed or developing, are
affected negatively by the failure of the IIPRC to embrace a broader
development mandate. All states benefit from global communicable disease
control and other global public goods, such as universal primary education
and food security. All global institutions must coordinate around these
areas, if for no other reason than the positive spillover effects on all
countries.
Our proposals seek to inject development into international intellectual
property, along the framework of a development as freedom model. In this
model, the innovation mandate of intellectual property is balanced and
weighed with "different, equally legitimate and democratically defined...
policy goals ...

to promote liberty and welfare in a broad sense."' 2" As we

have attempted to demonstrate, this balancing framework must occur
simultaneously within and among all aspects of the IIPRC, in order to
ensure that the most vulnerable populations benefit from and, at the very
least, are not harmed by, intellectual property.

293. The objectives of the Convention on Biodoversity, "are the conservation of
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate
access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate fundifig."
Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention Text art. 1, available at
http://www.cbd.int/conven- tion/articles.shtml?a=cbd-01.
294. Cottier, supra note 34.
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